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Executive Summary
The European Union suffers from an innovation deficit, which must be remedied if
the EU is to improve the quality of life of its citizens and remain competitive in the
global marketplace. In order to do so, more productive entrepreneurship is required.
We analyze how Europe’s institutional framework conditions could become more
supportive of entrepreneurship and innovation, and outline a reform strategy to
achieve this objective. To be viable, the strategy emphasizes the large cross-country
differences across the union. Each EU member state has evolved its particular
bundle of institutions, many of which are complementary to one another. If these
complexities are not acknowledged, well-intended reforms may become unpre-
dictable or even detrimental to entrepreneurship and economic development.
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical foundation to help identify the areas where the
need for reform is the greatest. The theories of the experimentally organized
economy and of entrepreneurial ecosystems are used to identify six competencies,
in addition to that of the entrepreneur, that are necessary for ideas to be generated,
identified, selected, and commercialized. The competencies are those of inventors,
professional managers, competent employees, venture capitalists, actors in sec-
ondary markets, and demanding customers. Importantly, no one is in charge of the
ecosystem’s skill structure, which limits what can be achieved through top-down
reform. We also draw on the varieties of capitalism literature, which identifies
institutional complementarities as an important driver of the persistent institutional
differences across polities. The existence of institutional complementarities implies
that viable policy changes must be compatible with existing institutional patterns
and that a specific change will have effects that extend throughout the institutional
system. As such, they help explain both gridlocks and cascading changes.
In Chap. 3, we discuss the institutions that the previous literature identifies as the
most relevant for nurturing the activities of entrepreneurs and other actors in the
ecosystem’s skill structure. Overall, we discuss nine areas: (i) the rule of law and
the protection of property rights; (ii) the tax system; (iii) regulations governing
savings, capital and finance; (iv) the organization of labor markets and social
insurance systems; (v) regulations governing goods and service markets; (vi) reg-
ulations governing bankruptcy and insolvency; (vii) R&D, commercialization and
ix
knowledge spillovers; (viii) human capital investments; and (ix) informal institu-
tions. Although our starting point is that some institutions or institutional forms are
simply the most propitious for entrepreneurship and economic growth, we com-
plement this first-best perspective with insights offered by the perspectives dis-
cussed in Chap. 2, and clarify the extent to which policies and institutions interact
with and reinforce one another.
In the fourth and final chapter we summarize the study and present our main
conclusions. To make the European Union more entrepreneurial to promote inno-
vation and economic growth we propose a reform strategy with respect to the
aforementioned nine areas, which we consider to be the most pertinent institutions
and policies in order to foster a productive entrepreneurial economy. Overall, the
proposed institutional changes move in a liberalizing direction, but we acknowledge
that one-size-fits-all policy reforms aimed at freer markets will not necessarily be
successful. Instead, a successful reform strategy must consider country differences
that affect the viability of reform. Nevertheless, policymakers must not lose sight
of the long-term goal of institutional liberalization to promote entrepreneurship,
innovation, and growth. Hopefully, this work inspires both confidence and humility





Abstract The European Union suffers from an innovation deficit, which must be
remedied if the EU is to improve the quality of life of its citizens and remain
competitive in the global marketplace. In order to do so, more productive
entrepreneurship is required. We analyze how Europe’s institutional framework
conditions could become more supportive of entrepreneurship and innovation, and
outline a reform strategy to achieve this objective. To be viable, the strategy
emphasizes the large cross-country differences across the union. Each EU member
state has evolved its particular bundle of institutions, many of which are comple-
mentary to one another. If these complexities are not acknowledged, well-intended
reforms may become unpredictable or even detrimental to entrepreneurship and
economic development.
Keywords Deregulation  Economic growth  Entrepreneurship  European
Union  Innovation  Institutional complementarity  Institutional reform  R&D 
Varieties of capitalism
In The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth from 2005, Harvard professor
Benjamin Friedman has a message that seems even more pertinent today than when
the book was first published: economic stagnation is harmful for a society’s moral
and democratic values. Dire economic times and a lack of economic opportunities
contribute to political populism of all colors. Friedman’s (2005) message is a
starting point of this volume, and makes what has been labeled “Europe’s Growth
Challenge” (Åslund and Djankov 2017) seem even more acute. In what follows, we
shall argue that innovation is key to improving the prospects for inclusive and
encompassing growth across Europe.
Today, the European Union suffers from an acknowledged lack of innovation.
A flagship initiative of the Union’s well-known 2020 strategy was the so-called
“Innovation Union”, launched with a tone of urgency in 2010: “We need to do
much better at turning our research into new and better services and products if we
© The Author(s) 2017
N. Elert et al., Institutional Reform for Innovation and Entrepreneurship,
SpringerBriefs in Economics, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55092-3_1
1
are to remain competitive in the global marketplace and improve the quality of life
in Europe. We are facing a situation of ‘innovation emergency’” (European
Commission 2015).1 In spite of this urgent tone, little has been accomplished in the
intervening years. The Union’s own composite innovation index, measured by the
European Innovation Scoreboard, has only increased modestly since the strategy
was formulated (European Union 2016; see also Fig. A.1 in the Appendix).
Increasing innovation therefore remains an imperative, but the way to achieve it
is a larger issue. In our view, the common concept that increased R&D spending is
the tool that promotes innovation exposes an overly mechanistic view of how the
economy functions. New knowledge and inventions are only the first steps in the
innovation and commercialization process, and for increased R&D to translate into
economic growth, entrepreneurs must exploit the new knowledge and inventions by
introducing new methods of production or new products into the marketplace
(Bhidé 2008). Hence, if Europeans are to benefit from innovation and investment in
knowledge and capital to the greatest extent possible, their economies must become
more entrepreneurial (Acs et al. 2009; Baumol 2010).
At first glance, the means of achieving this goal are clear from an economist’s
perspective. At least since Baumol (1990), there has been a recognition that
entrepreneurship and innovation are shaped by a society’s rules of the game—its
institutional environment (Aldrich 2011; Estrin et al. 2013). Entrepreneurs and
other actors in the so-called entrepreneurial ecosystem or skill structure are crucially
dependent on this environment. In this study, we seek to determine how Europe’s
institutional framework conditions could become more supportive of
entrepreneurship and innovation, and outline a reform strategy to achieve this
objective.
When political and economic institutions are structured to reward productive
entrepreneurial activities (such as starting and expanding firms that provide goods
and services that people want) at the expense of non-productive and even
destructive activities (such as rent seeking or excessive lobbying), then many
researchers argue that more innovation and economic growth will occur, at least in
the long run (Mueller and Thomas 2000; Hwang and Powell 2005; Acs et al. 2008;
Urbano and Alvarez 2014). Thus, we will focus on economic institutions that have
previously been identified as particularly relevant for enabling productive
entrepreneurship (Hall and Jones 1999; Béchard and Grégoire 2005; Henrekson and
Johansson 2009; Bjørnskov and Foss 2013). In summary, we propose institutional
reforms pertaining to nine broad areas:
(i) The rule of law and protection of property rights. These are the most
fundamental rules of the economic system, and all member states must
ensure that they are stable and secure. With regard to intellectual property
rights, an important balance must be struck between the interests of
investors and the need for knowledge diffusion.
1See http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/index_en.cfm?pg=why.
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(ii) Taxation. Many types of taxes affect entrepreneurial decisions. While tax
rates should generally be low or moderate, policy makers should strive for
simplicity rather than (targeted) concessions, and for a high degree of tax
neutrality across owner categories, sources of finance and different types of
economic activities.
(iii) Savings, capital and finance. These institutions should be reformed to
support increased private wealth formation and the creation of a dynamic
venture capital industry, since these are crucial sources of financing, par-
ticularly in the early stages of entrepreneurial projects. As a large share of
savings in the economy currently goes into pension funds, it would be
helpful to allow at least part of these assets to be invested in entrepreneurial
firms and not just in real estate, public stock and bonds.
(iv) Labor markets and social security. Institutions should facilitate the
recruitment of workers with the necessary competencies and reforms should
strive to remove onerous labor market regulations. Overly stringent
employment regulations may also spur actors in the entrepreneurial
ecosystem to devise arrangements that circumvent the regulations, ulti-
mately resulting in the emergence of an underground economy.
Furthermore, incentives are best served by government income insurance
systems that encourage activation, mobility and risk-taking. Social security
institutions should enable the portability of tenure rights and pension plans
as well as a full decoupling of health insurance from the current employer,
to avoid punishing those individuals who leave tenured employment posi-
tions to pursue entrepreneurial projects.
(v) Regulation of goods and service markets. Preventing market-leading
incumbents from unduly exploiting their dominant market positions is
essential. Lowered entry barriers are key to this reform area, as is the
opening of those parts of the economy that are almost invariably closed to
private production, such as healthcare and schooling. Within a
well-designed system of public financing, sizeable private production and
contestability should be encouraged.
(vi) Bankruptcy law and insolvency regulation. Entrepreneurial failure provides
valuable information to other economic actors. Failed ventures must be
discontinued so that their resources can be redirected to more productive
uses. Bankruptcy law and insolvency regulation should therefore be rela-
tively generous and allow for a “second chance”. However, filing for
bankruptcy should not be too easy, as that encourages undue exploitation
and destructive entrepreneurship, harming creditors and the rest of the
community.
(vii) R&D, commercialization and knowledge spillovers. R&D spending is only
an input; for it to translate into economic growth, entrepreneurs must exploit
the inventions and created knowledge by introducing new methods of
production or new products into the marketplace. Therefore, instead of
focusing on quantitative spending goals and targeted R&D support, policy
should more generally make it easier to start and grow businesses.
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(viii) Incentives for human capital investment. Policy should strive to create
positive incentives for the individual to acquire knowledge and skills,
whether through formal or workplace education. Incentives must also be
developed by the education system itself to supply such opportunities. In
this respect, the U.S. university system seems more responsive to the
economic needs of society than European university systems. The U.S.
system could be an important role model, as long as due attention is paid to
European concerns regarding accessibility and equity.
(ix) Informal institutions. Informal institutions affect the workings of formal
institutions but may also be important in their own right for fostering
entrepreneurship. Norms and habits that facilitate cooperation and imper-
sonal exchange must be strengthened, particularly with regard to trust.
High-trust environments have been found to nurture market entry, enterprise
growth and productive entrepreneurship. The extent to which policy can
influence this development is nevertheless doubtful.
As our summary of the results suggests, our overall message is that policymakers
in member states and at the centralized EU level should institute entre-
preneurship-friendly institutions largely by undertaking economic policy liberal-
ization. Ultimately, that was the original intent of much of the European Union
project and the promotion of the so-called four freedoms of its single market (of
goods, workers, services and capital). Convincing arguments have also been put
forth that the Union’s procedural logic will inherently push the institutional setups
of member states in a liberalizing direction (Scharpf 2010).2 However, the manner
in which countries undertake reforms is fundamentally important.
A best-practice reform approach would be to identify a country (whether a
member or non-member) that appears to be performing well in a particular insti-
tutional dimension and to promote and adopt this institution in other countries
(Rodrik 2008). Indeed, this type of approach has been extensively promoted by
organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF, especially in developing
countries. This is problematic for several reasons.
First, first-order economic principles—such as the protection of property and
contract enforcement—do not map onto unique policy packages; there is no unique
correspondence between well-functioning institutions and the form that such
institutions take (Berkowitz et al. 2003; Djankov et al. 2003; Evans 2004; Mukand
and Rodrik 2005; Dixit 2007; Rodrik 2007). Therefore, reformers must creatively
package those principles into institutional designs that are sensitive to local con-
straints and take advantage of local opportunities.
2As explained at length by Scharpf (2010), a substantial asymmetry exists between the clout/scope
of the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)—automatically binding throughout the entire
EU—and the high consensus requirements of political action at the European level. It is difficult
for member states to protect a national regulation or policy that allegedly impedes any of the four
freedoms.
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Second, not all institutions that affect entrepreneurial activity can be influenced
through policy measures even in the long run. This is true for many informal
institutions, such as trust and reputation (Greif 2005) or the way people speak of
businessmen and entrepreneurs (McCloskey 2016). Affecting these institutions by
means of policy may only be possible through indirect means, as these institutions
often only change incrementally over time and/or through bottom-up processes that
may be rapid but difficult to anticipate and engineer.
The sharp difference in the initial conditions of member states is a third reason
why the first-best approach to institutional reform may become problematic.
Countries around the world obviously differ greatly in their capacity to achieve high
standards of living for their citizens. In the European Union, GDP per capita in the
richest member countries (Ireland and the Netherlands) is two to three times higher
than that in the poorest EU countries (Romania and Bulgaria). On a deeper level,
each of the Union’s 28 member countries has evolved its particular bundle of
institutions, many of which are complementary to one another. According to the
varieties of capitalism (VoC) perspective (Hall and Soskice 2001), institutional
complementarities mean that one cannot simply adopt institutions that work well in
another country and expect them to work in the same way in a different institutional
context. Instead, a prudent and viable reform approach must acknowledge these
complexities, or change might become unpredictable or even detrimental to
entrepreneurship and economic development. This challenge may explain, for
example, why European attempts to imitate policies aimed at stimulating venture
capital have (thus far) been unsuccessful (European Commission 2011, 2013).
Reforms that fail to take institutional complementarities into account risk rendering
the overall institutional system less efficient (Braunerhjelm and Henrekson 2016;
Rodrik 2008).
The use of the VoC perspective also allows us to highlight the limitations of our
analysis. For example, institutional complementarities are not necessarily confined
by the borders of national polities but can work across borders (as in the case of the
EU itself) as well as within them. Concerning the latter, institutions at the local level
are certainly important. Granted, they commonly evolve and operate against the
backdrop of the national institutional framework, particularly in non-federal states,
but local initiatives and policies have plenty of room to influence the local entre-
preneurial climate in any country.3 While such considerations are important to
recognize, they are beyond the scope of this study, which instead focuses on the
national (and supranational) level of political reform.4
These problems do not reduce the need for an institutional climate in Europe that
is more conducive to entrepreneurship, and they should not make us lose sight of
policy liberalization as a long-term goal for the promotion of entrepreneurship and
3This pertains to both formal institutions, such as taxes (e.g., Haughwout et al. 2004) and regu-
lations (Tannenwald 1997), and to informal institutions, such as the attitudes and social legitimacy
derived from entrepreneurship (Elert 2014).
4Regarding local institutions that foster entrepreneurship, the reader is referred to Andersson and
Henrekson (2015), and Stam and Bosma (2015).
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innovation in Europe. Properly acknowledged, these issues can inspire humility and
hope regarding what can be achieved in both the short and long terms. They should
lead to the recognition that the reform journeys that countries undertake may look
very different—more or less bumpy, long and winding, etc.—even though they
ought to lead in the same basic direction (if not to the same endpoint). It is beyond
the scope of this study to develop a detailed reform roadmap for each EU country,
let alone account for regional differences within these countries. Therefore, we seek
to identify the general direction that should be taken while emphasizing those
differences between the EU countries that must be reckoned with by those assigned
to suggest or implement specific reform packages.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. In Chap. 2, we define and
discuss what we mean by the type of entrepreneurship that European countries
should strive towards in order to promote innovation. We also identify the
actors/functions/competencies in the economy that, in addition to the entrepreneur,
are relevant to yielding the desired results. Furthermore, we discuss the VoC
approach and how it informs our analysis. In Chap. 3, we draw on these insights
and discuss the institutional prerequisites for the development of a vibrant entre-
preneurial economy or entrepreneurial ecosystem. Our analysis suggests how
institutional framework conditions ought to be improved and how such policy
changes will depend on countries’ differing starting conditions and institutional
complementarities. Finally, in Chap. 4, we provide a summary of the argument and
present our main conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Innovation, Entrepreneurship
and the Complementary Skill Structure
Abstract This chapter provides a theoretical foundation to help identify the areas
where the need for reform is the greatest. The theories of the experimentally orga-
nized economy and of entrepreneurial ecosystems are used to identify six compe-
tencies, in addition to that of the entrepreneur, that are necessary for ideas to be
generated, identified, selected and commercialized. The competencies are those of
inventors, professional managers, competent employees, venture capitalists, actors
in secondary markets, and demanding customers. Importantly, no one is in charge of
the ecosystem’s skill structure, which limits what can be achieved through top-down
reform. We also draw on the varieties of capitalism literature, which identifies
institutional complementarities as an important driver of the persistent institutional
differences across polities. The existence of institutional complementarities implies
that viable policy changes must be compatible with existing institutional patterns and
that a specific change will have effects that extend throughout the institutional
system. As such, they help explain both grid-locks and cascading changes.
Keywords Coordinated market economy  Entrepreneurial ecosystem 
Experimentally organized economy  Institutional complementarity  Liberal
market economy  Skill structure  Varieties of capitalism
Since Joseph Schumpeter’s (1934) seminal work, the view that an economy’s
long-term growth depends on its ability to exploit innovations has become com-
monplace (Cohen 2010). Creating these innovations is typically seen as the role of the
entrepreneur, whom Schumpeter came to view as the primus motor of economic
growth.However, entrepreneurs do not operate alone or in a vacuum; they depend on a
broader entrepreneurial ecosystem: a skill structure consisting of an array of actors
with complementary skills and resources to realize their ideas (Johansson 2009).
Furthermore, all actors in the ecosystem’s skill structure are constrained and enabled
by their institutional environment (Aldrich 2011; Estrin et al. 2013). In this chapter,
we present our definition of entrepreneurship and consider how it differs across
Europe. We then present the skill structure’s other actors, who are necessary to reap
the full benefits of innovations and their subsequent commercialization. Lastly, we
will discuss the VoC perspective and what it entails for the remainder of our analysis.
© The Author(s) 2017
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2.1 Entrepreneurship in Europe—A First Glance
Today, the importance of entrepreneurship is generally undisputed (Lazear 2005;
Baumol 2010; Carree and Thurik 2010), but its definition and measurement remain
topics of considerable debate. While an economy’s self-employment rate, startup rate
or business ownership rate are frequently used as empirical measures of its aggregate
entrepreneurial activity, most small and new businesses are best characterized as
permanently small. They seldom have any ambition to grow and should not be mis-
taken for nascent entrepreneurial firms (Hurst and Pugsley 2011; Nightingale and
Coad 2014). Researchers increasingly emphasize the need to focus on measures that
adequately capture innovative and growth-oriented entrepreneurship (Shane 2009;
Stam et al. 2012; Henrekson and Sanandaji 2014). They also focus on the distinction
between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship— that is, whether one becomes
an entrepreneur because of a potent business idea or for other reasons, such as a lack of
a better means to earn a living (Vivarelli 2013). What matters are the qualitative
aspects of entrepreneurship, and empirical evidence suggests that an economy that
fosters (a few) high-growth firms and high-impact entrepreneurial firms grows faster
than an economy that tries to maximize the number of Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises (SMEs) or the self-employment rate (Shane 2008; Henrekson and
Sanandaji 2014).
We adopt a definition of entrepreneurship that is geared towards making it
essential to innovation and economic growth. In line with Henrekson and Stenkula
(2016) and closely related to Wennekers and Thurik (1999), we define
entrepreneurship as the ability and willingness of individuals, both independently
and within organizations,
• to discover and create new economic opportunities;
• to introduce their ideas into the market under uncertainty, making decisions
regarding the location, product design, use of resources and reward systems; and
• to create value, which often, though not always, means that the entrepreneur
aims to expand the firm to its full potential.1
A good first approximation of the prevalence of this type (or possibly these
types) of entrepreneurship in Europe is provided by two measures from the annual
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) surveys. The first measure, high-growth
expectation early-stage entrepreneurship, is the percentage of an economy’s total
1This is not to deny that there are motives other than monetary gain to become an entrepreneur.
Many entrepreneurs have an intrinsic desire to produce a valued good or service and to outcompete
other entrepreneurs (Baumol 2002; Manish and Sutter 2016). However, the pursuit of economic
gain has a central function even in this case as the accumulation of net assets is a necessary means
for an entrepreneur who wants to expand and attain a leading position in the marketplace. It also
serves as the yardstick for comparing how successful one’s business is relative to others.
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entrepreneurial activity (TEA)2 in which the entrepreneur expects to grow to
employ at least five employees within five years. The second measure, improve-
ment-driven opportunity entrepreneurship, is the percentage of those involved in
TEA (i) who claim to be driven by opportunity as opposed to finding no other
option for work, and (ii) who indicate that their chief motives for becoming
involved in this opportunity are gaining independence or increasing their income
rather than just maintaining it.
Table 2.1 presents the correlation between these measures, the Union’s inno-
vation index and PPP-adjusted GDP per capita for the 23 EU member states for
which there are data for 2014. High-growth expectation early-stage entrepreneur-
ship is the only measure not to have a strong positive correlation with the others; it
is virtually uncorrelated with improvement-driven opportunity entrepreneurship and
negatively correlated with innovation and GDP per capita.3
Although high-growth expectation early-stage entrepreneurship fails to exhibit a
positive correlation with innovation and GDP per capita, it may still be important
for countries at a lower level of economic development.4 Figure 2.1 presents the
average country scores for the two GEM measures over the period 2010–2014. As a
point of comparison, we include numbers for the United States, which is note-
worthy for its high scores on both measures. While some EU countries, such as the
Czech Republic and Slovenia, also score highly on both measures, the correlation is
nonexistent in this sample as well (r = −0.085). Some countries, such as Poland,
Greece and Spain, score low on both measures, while others have a high score on
one measure but a low score on the other. This scatterplot suggests that the way in
which entrepreneurship manifests itself differs considerably across European
countries.
2TEA is defined as the proportion of working-age adults (18–64) in the population who either are
involved in the process of founding a firm or are active owner-managers of firms that are less than
3.5 years old.
3If high-growth expectation early-stage entrepreneurship and improvement-driven opportunity
entrepreneurship are instead calculated as a share of the population, the positive correlation
between improvement-driven opportunity entrepreneurship and innovation as well as between
improvement-driven opportunity entrepreneurship and GDP per capita disappears. There is now
also a strong positive correlation between the two entrepreneurship measures. This underscores
that analyses of empirical measures of entrepreneurship should be conducted with caution since the
specific measure of entrepreneurship used might substantially influence the analysis. However, we
deem that focusing on the share of TEA that is growth-oriented and improvement-driven is more
relevant in our case since the total TEA in each country differs depending on a number of historical
and structural factors.
4However, an entrepreneur’s assertion that (s)he expects to employ at least five employees does
not mean that these plans will be realized. Another relevant measure of entrepreneurship could
therefore focus on the prevalence of startups that actually have expanded and hired people.
Research has shown that so-called gazelles, i.e., new firms with a high growth rate, are important
for economic development (see, e.g., Henrekson and Johansson 2010; Haltiwanger et al. 2013;
Coad et al. 2014).
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0.51b 0.42a −0.09 1.00
Note The innovation index is defined by the European Innovation Scoreboard; GDP per capita is in
current PPP dollars for 2015. b and a denote statistical significance at the 1 and 5% level,
respectively
Source Eurostat and Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
Fig. 2.1 Improvement-driven opportunity and high-growth expectation early-stage entrepreneur-
ship in European countries and the United States, 2010–2014. Note Defined as the percentage of
all entrepreneurs (TEA) that claim to qualify for either or both types of entrepreneurship. Source
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
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As an additional illustration of the differences in starting conditions, Fig. 2.2
shows the large EU cross-country variation in the need for job creation, captured by
the employment rate; it varies from 55% in Greece to approximately 80% in
Sweden. Furthermore, we see that the rate of high-growth expectation early-stage
entrepreneurship is high in several countries with low levels of aggregate
employment (Greece is an exception, scoring low on both entrepreneurship mea-
sures and employment). Thus, the good news is that there are many entrepreneurs
who aim for high growth in these countries; the bad news is that this is insufficient
to close the employment gap vis-a-vis other countries with high employment rates.
For countries with low employment rates, notably the three Mediterranean
countries, more necessity entrepreneurship is needed to create jobs in the formal
sector. Additionally, these member countries can (and do) compensate to some
extent for their lower employment rates by having larger shadow (or underground)
economies (Schneider 2015; see Appendix Fig. A.2). In Bulgaria and Romania, the
shadow economy is estimated to be approximately 30% of official GDP, while the
proportion is less than half that in the Northern European countries. However,
activity in the shadow economy is generally a poor substitute for activity in the
formal sector, partly because it creates unfair competition with firms that do adhere
to rules and regulations. More importantly, firms in the shadow economy cannot
benefit from the division of labor and specialization to the same extent as formal
firms. They are therefore unlikely to grow beyond a small size. Foremost, they
should be considered a means of poverty alleviation (La Porta and Shleifer 2008)












Fig. 2.2 Employment share in 2015 among people aged 20–64 in EU countries. Note There are
no data for the U.S. for the 20–64-year olds. However, in the OECD data, which reports
employment rates for 15–64-year olds, the U.S. employment rate was 68.7% in 2015, compared to
75.5% in top-ranked Sweden and 50.8% in Greece, which has the lowest employment rate among
15–64-year olds. Source OECD
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2.2 The Entrepreneurial Ecosystem: The Requisite
Complementary Skill Structure
Recent discussions in the scientific literature of entrepreneurial ecosystems (Stam
2015; Autio 2016) will remind Swedish readers of the theory of the experimentally
organized economy (EOE) and competence blocs, which are most closely associ-
ated with the writings of Eliasson (1996); see Johansson (2009) for a synthesis. This
theory shares many features with the theory of entrepreneurial ecosystems, par-
ticularly the notion that the entrepreneur does not act in a vacuum. For our pur-
poses, it is beneficial to approach this “ecosystem” from the EOE perspective,
which considers the economic problem to be one of coordination in the vein of
Hayek (1945). While the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is the main actor, who creates
and expands businesses by identifying and exploiting new ideas, the success of
these ideas depends crucially on an array of other actors/functions whose com-
plementary competencies and inputs are necessary to create and use productive
knowledge.
In addition to that of the entrepreneur, the EOE literature identifies at least six
competencies that are necessary to generate, identify, select and commercialize
ideas. These competencies exist and are deployed (to varying degrees) in virtually
all market-based economies. This results in varying outcomes in terms of what type
of entrepreneurial ecosystem is produced and ultimately what type of innovative
output is realized. In our updated interpretation, the following actors and compe-
tencies constitute what we call the skill structure in a well-functioning entrepre-
neurial ecosystem:
(i) Inventors. Entrepreneurs generally have a good overall understanding of how
to exploit an opportunity, but they may lack highly specific knowledge
regarding the relevant technologies. Inventors may create the foundation for
a firm through an invention (patented or not) or work to solve specific
problems.
(ii) Professional managers. Professional managers are needed to take commer-
cialization beyond the initial entrepreneurial phase and to organize the
expansion of the original venture into a large-scale operation.
(iii) Competent employees. Economic development and growth requires skilled
specialists, production staff and front-line personnel. The functioning of the
labor market and the educational system is crucial for supplying firms with
workers with relevant skills.
(iv) Venture capitalists. They are either business angels or venture capital firms
who finance firms and entrepreneurs with “intelligent” capital in the early
phases of development. They identify entrepreneurs and their projects,
determine whether and how much to invest and decide how the investment
should be valued. In this process, they also provide the firm with industry
experience, valuable contacts and management skills.
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(v) Actors in secondary markets. They can be portfolio investors, buy-out firms,
management buy-ins or wealthy industrialists who become controlling
owners. Their skills and functions are similar to those of venture capitalists,
but they operate later in a firm’s lifecycle. They assess the value of firms,
contribute capital and evaluate the competence of the owner(s) and man-
agement. They also help entrepreneurs and venture capitalists reduce or
terminate their involvement as the firm moves into a more mature stage.
(vi) Demanding customers. Consumption is the ultimate goal of production, and
for growth to occur, the products produced must be what consumers demand.
The most demanding consumers/clients function as particularly crucial
sources of information regarding consumer needs and preferences. One
important entrepreneurial skill is thus identifying and cooperating with the
right customers.5
The ecosystem’s skill structure is complete when it has acquired enough critical
mass to attract competent actors to a sufficient degree to fulfill each function. A lack
of requisite competencies or an important actor category may significantly impede
or even prevent the entrepreneurial process from taking place. In a stylized manner,
Fig. 2.3 attempts to capture the phases during which the various actors in the skill
structure participate in the commercialization process, from the conception and
development of an idea through commercialization to full-scale industrialization.
Certainly, the details of the commercialization process vary, and the same person
can fulfill more than one role in the skill structure. Oftentimes, the process begins
when the entrepreneur identifies a potential opportunity in interactions with
demanding customers, which (s)he then strives to develop into an idea that can be
commercialized. However, entrepreneurship may also involve creating something
that customers have yet to imagine and are thus unable to demand. Additionally,
while inventors are commonly involved in resolving technical problems, they can
sometimes also initiate a process that is then further developed by the entrepreneur.
Generally, the early commercialization phase mainly involves entrepreneurs and,
to a lesser extent, competent employees, while the business angels and venture
capital firms finance development.6 In the scale-up phase, professional managers
become involved, together with a greater number of competent employees, while
actors in secondary markets assume responsibility for financing, which (depending
on sector) might be substantial at this point. Moreover, actors can work alongside
each other or overlap during different phases, and professional managers and actors
in the secondary market can be involved at an earlier stage, while the entrepreneur
may at times also assume the role of inventor or professional manager.
5In some industries, innovation is largely driven by the users (customers) rather than by firms. This
user role is particularly common in industries that produce technical appliances and scientific
instruments (see von Hippel et al. 2011).
6This does not exclude family, friends and maverick enthusiasts, but the focus here is on pro-
fessional finance.
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The ecosystem’s skill structure is useful when tracing the institutional under-
pinnings of an entrepreneurial regime because the activities of its actors depend
crucially on a society’s “rules of the game” (North 1990; Johansson 2009, p. 187).
Some institutions are relevant to all actors. Obvious examples are the protection of
private property rights, the rule of law and a high level of generalized trust. Other
institutions are more competence-specific and mainly affect the broader entrepre-
neurial system through their effect on that competence. Venture capitalists, for
example, obviously depend directly on the institutions underpinning finance and the
venture capital industry, whereas the availability of competent employees depends
more directly on the functioning of the labor market, the incentives for investing in
human capital and the quality of the educational system.
Fig. 2.3 The skill structure: from a concept to a large-scale firm. Source Adaptation from Eliasson
(1996) and Henrekson and Johansson (2009)
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The EOE perspective takes for granted that no specific agent in the ecosystem’s
skill structure is in charge; no one “owns it” or understands more than a fraction of
its inner workings. This is also emphasized in the broader discussion of entrepre-
neurial ecosystems (Autio 2016) with the implication that no one necessarily feels
responsible for ascertaining the efficient functioning of the ecosystem. Thus, tra-
ditional “top-down” policy approaches are unlikely to work well (Goldfarb and
Henrekson 2003; Acs et al. 2014; Autio and Levie 2016) since they “build on the
assumption that it is possible to identify clear-cut ‘failures’ in the functioning of a
given market or an innovation system” and that such failures “can be fixed through
top-down intervention” (Autio 2016, p. 22). The very lack of ownership of the
entrepreneurial ecosystem means that there is no chain of command that can be
applied, which is a central reason that a top-down “command-and-control”
approach is unlikely to work or at least should be undertaken with great humility.7
In principle, entrepreneurship can be encouraged by efforts ranging from specific
targeted support, such as technology assistance to small firms, to general macro
policies aimed at maintaining a stable economic environment. Our definition of
entrepreneurship in Sect. 2.1 precludes an entrepreneurship policy that is mainly
focused on encouraging self-employment or small business activity, often referred
to as SME policy. Moreover, as it is difficult—if not impossible—for policymakers
to a priori determine who will become an entrepreneur (let alone a successful one),
measures directed at a specific group (such as the unemployed) or a specific form of
business (such as small or new firms) are largely misdirected (Holtz-Eakin 2000;
Lerner 2009). If anything, such measures make for a complex system with detailed
rules, exceptions and exceptions to the exceptions. They also result in increased
administration and information costs that are almost always more burdensome for
small and medium-sized firms (European Commission 2007, 2008). Furthermore,
such programs invariably provide opportunities for unproductive and destructive
entrepreneurship.
Since few (potential) innovations are Pareto superior, there have been important
self-serving interests (such as guilds and unions) throughout history that stood to
lose from the introduction of such innovations, usually because those interests
owned specific assets dedicated to the state-of-the-art mode of production. An asset
used in a highly specialized activity can rarely be reallocated to another activity
without incurring substantial costs regardless of whether it consists of physical,
human or intangible capital (Caballero 2007). Thus, the value of the asset is con-
tingent on its continued use precisely in its specialized activity. To protect the value
of their assets, special interests resort to using non-market means to block the
market’s selection process, including (notably) legal measures in the form of laws
and regulations barring the innovation in question (Olson 1982; Bauer 1995; Mokyr
1998). Regardless of the efficiency of an institution, its beneficiaries thwart change
7This was already observed by Smith (1966/1759, pp. 342–343) who warned against succumbing
to the temptation of thinking like a “man of the system”, who thinks he can “arrange the different
members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a
chess-board”.
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to preserve their rents, causing it to become entrenched and non-adaptive over time
(Etzioni 1985). To avoid having to fight the same battle time and time again, such
interests may have built in an anti-innovation bias into the existing institutional
structure.
Therefore, public policy should not try to influence the “natural” evolution of
firm size, growth, or form through targeted subsidies or tax breaks. Instead, it
should leave this evolution to market forces and profit motives.8 Policy should aim
to support or develop an institutional system that encourages socially productive
entrepreneurial activity irrespective of business form and enables the creation and
commercialization of valuable knowledge (Acs and Szerb 2007; Braunerhjelm et al.
2010). Whether this implies a high or low rate of self-employment or of SMEs is
largely irrelevant.
2.3 Diverse Capitalisms in the European Union
There is considerable institutional diversity even among advanced countries; the
United States, Japan and European countries have markedly different models of
capitalism, none of which can be declared a clear “winner” (Hall and Soskice 2001;
Freeman 2002; Amable 2003). While top-down and bottom-up convergence has
occurred in EU countries over the years, member states still differ substantially in
their institutional organization, and this diversity is evident even among countries
with similar levels of real income. Such differences among countries are not sur-
prising given the documented importance of historical values and norms, lock-in
effects and path dependence in institutional evolution (Arthur 1989; Reher 1998;
Acemoglu et al. 2001; Nunn 2009; Galasso and Profeta 2011; Giuliano and Nunn
2013; Alesina et al. 2015).
This diversity is a common starting point in the various incarnations of the
varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature, which is closely associated with the seminal
work of Hall and Soskice (2001). In this literature, institutional complementarities
are considered a main driver of the persistence of institutional differences across
VoCs. Institutions are complementary if the presence or efficiency of one institution
increases the returns from or efficiency of the other. Put simply, if we observe that
institution XA is working well in country A, we cannot assume that copying and then
8Some authors do admit a role for targeted support. Autio and Rannikko (2016) summarize
collected insights, arguing that policy measures that are effective in supporting high-growth firms
should be: (1) highly selective, requiring strong, verified growth ambition and some evidence of
growth ability as an initial selection criteria; (2) progressive, tying continued support to pro-
gressively more demanding milestones that the selected companies should be required to obtain;
(3) highly hands-on, emphasizing active, capacity-boosting measures rather than a passive pro-
vision of resources and general advice; (4) emphasize partnering with specialized private sector
service providers to ensure relevance; (5) substantial enough to ensure meaningful chances of
achieving tangible outcomes on growth. This list reveals the practical difficulties of getting tar-
geted support to work efficiently.
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substituting it for XB in country B will yield similar results since the efficiency of
any variation of the institution X depends on the workings of other institutions that
differ across the two countries (say, YA and YB, and ZA and ZB), which in turn may
be more or less amenable to reforms (e.g., depending on whether they are formal or
informal).
Therefore, “[n]ations with a particular type of coordination in one sphere of the
economy should tend to develop complementary practices in other spheres as well”
(Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 18), and institutional practices will not be randomly
distributed across nations. Rather, we should be able to observe country clustering
in the dimensions that distinguish VoCs from one another. For our purposes, the
existence of institutional complementarities implies that viable policy changes must
be compatible with existing institutional patterns. Complementarity also implies
that a specific change will have effects that extend throughout the institutional
system. The fear of this type of snowballing can explain the existence of institu-
tional inertia, as even piecemeal changes are blocked for fear that they may lead to
major changes (Amable 2003, p. 7; Aoki 2001).9
The exact results from the application of the VoC perspective empirically
depend on the number of dimensions considered. For example, Hall and Soskice
(2001) emphasize a society’s approach to coordination as its key distinguishing
feature, and therefore put the spotlight on institutions that facilitate coordination by
enabling (i) the exchange of information, (ii) the monitoring of behavior and the
(iii) sanctioning of defections from cooperation. This framework yields a core
distinction between two types of political economies. In liberal market economies
(LMEs), firms coordinate their activities primarily via firm hierarchies and com-
petitive market arrangements. In coordinated market economies (CMEs), coordi-
nation relies more heavily on non-market relationships.
Subsequent researchers have taken more dimensions into account and offered
more fine-grained contributions. For example, Amable (2003) examines how five
spheres in the economy complement one another: wage-setting systems and labor
markets, product market competition, finance and corporate governance, the wel-
fare state and social protection, and the educational system. Using a combination of
factor and cluster analyses, he thereby identifies five capitalist models: the
market-based, the continental European, the social-democratic, the Mediterranean,
and the Asian. Another closely related school is that of French regulation theory
(Boyer 2005), which identifies four types of capitalism: market-oriented,
meso-corporatist, state-driven, and social-democratic.
In a recent contribution, Dilli and Elert (2016) undertake an analysis with a
scope similar to that of Amable (2003) but in which the main focus is on under-
standing the complementarities and features of the institutional structures under-
lying entrepreneurial regimes. They do a stepwise aggregation of data in an analysis
covering 22 countries (19 EU-28 countries together with Norway, Switzerland and
9Typically, losses are also more salient and weigh more heavily on utility than gains (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979), which in and of itself breeds resistance to change.
2.3 Diverse Capitalisms in the European Union 19
the United States as points of comparison) and apply a multitude of variables.
A principal component analysis reveals three empirically relevant entrepreneurial
dimensions across countries: necessity-based nascent entrepreneurship, opportunity
entrepreneurship, and aspirational entrepreneurship. When these dimensions are
included in a cluster analysis together with a number of theoretically and empiri-
cally relevant institutional features, countries cluster into no less than six different
groups, each with a distinct bundle of entrepreneurial characteristics and institu-
tional attributes.
The main implication of these approaches is that different reform strategies are
appropriate to promote entrepreneurship and economic growth in European coun-
tries in different clusters. This will inform our own analysis addressing why and
how European countries should undertake reforms to promote entrepreneurship and
innovation. Although the general direction in which countries should move will be
specified with respect to each area in Chap. 3, those paths can differ considerably
depending on the initial economic and institutional conditions. Specifically, our
contention is that not taking institutional complementarities into account is likely to
breed reform failure. Furthermore, the VoC perspective helps us explain the
non-random interconnectedness of various institutions, the persistence of institu-
tional forms that are (seemingly) not conducive to entrepreneurship and growth, and
thus the prospects for amending these institutions.
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in the European Union—A Reform
Agenda
Abstract In this chapter, we discuss the institutions that the previous literature
identifies as the most relevant for nurturing the activities of entrepreneurs and other
actors in the ecosystem’s skill structure. Overall, we discuss nine areas: (i) the rule
of law and the protection of property rights; (ii) the tax system; (iii) regulations
governing savings, capital and finance; (iv) the organization of labor markets and
social insurance systems; (v) regulations governing goods and service markets;
(vi) regulations governing bankruptcy and insolvency; (vii) R&D, commercializa-
tion and knowledge spillovers; (viii) human capital investments; and (ix) informal
institutions. Although our starting point is that some institutions or institutional
forms are simply the most propitious for entrepreneurship and economic growth, we
complement this first-best perspective with insights offered by the perspectives
discussed in Chap. 2, and clarify the extent to which policies and institutions
interact with and reinforce one another.
Keywords Bankruptcy law  Employment protection legislation  Financing of
entrepreneurship  Human capital  Informal institutions  Knowledge spillovers 
Product market regulations  Rule of law  Social insurance  Taxation
In this chapter, we discuss the institutions that the previous literature identifies as
the most relevant for nurturing the activities of entrepreneurs and other actors in the
ecosystem’s skill structure. The starting point for this discussion can be labeled the
first-best perspective, according to which some institutions or institutional forms are
simply the most propitious for entrepreneurship and economic growth. This per-
spective has rightfully been criticized as too simplistic (Rodrik 2008). McCloskey
(2016) quips that it essentially amounts to the idea that one should “add institutions
and stir”. Hence, we recognize the need to complement it with insights offered by
the EOE and the VoC perspectives discussed in the previous chapter.
Previous research suggests that (innovation-based and high-impact)
entrepreneurship has numerous important prerequisites, such as an educated
workforce (Béchard and Grégoire 2005; Kuratko 2005), a well-functioning labor
market (Poschke 2013), and a tax system that favors work, investment and
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entrepreneurial effort (Cullen and Gordon 2007). Giving a complete overview of the
large empirical literature that identifies the effect of various institutions and policies
on the rate of entrepreneurial activity is beyond the scope of this chapter. However,
it is important to make several points clarifying the extent to which policies and
institutions (both formal and informal) interact with and reinforce one another. In
what follows, we will highlight what we consider to be the most pertinent insti-
tutions and policies that determine the extent to which a productive entrepreneurial
economy is fostered.
3.1 The Rule of Law and Protection of Property Rights
3.1.1 Preamble
The legal principle that a polity should not be governed by arbitrary decisions made
by autocratic rulers or government officials is central to any country striving for
prosperity. Likewise, private property rights—the existence of legal titles to hold
property and the protection thereof—is arguably the most fundamental of all eco-
nomic institutions (North and Weingast 1989; Libecap 1993; Acemoglu et al. 2001;
Baumol 2002; Rodrik et al. 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Besley and Ghatak
2010) and relevant for all actors in the ecosystem’s skill structure. Secure property
rights ensure that physical objects can be turned into capital (De Soto 2000), a
transformation that requires judgment, imagination, and innovation. Without con-
trol over assets and their returns, a potential entrepreneur will lack the incentive to
innovate, but what matters is de facto control; formal property rights which do not
offer control rights in practice are useless, while the absence of formal property
rights need not be prohibitive if control rights are sufficiently strong (Rodrik 2007).
However, entrepreneurs in countries with weak property rights are generally dis-
couraged from (re)investing (retained) earnings in their ventures; see Johnson et al.
(2002). The division and specialization of labor are also hampered, which narrows
the range of potential entrepreneurial discoveries.
If the protection of property rights is too weak, destructive entrepreneurship,
such as extortion and corruption, is likely to flourish. Organized crime syndicates
such as the mafia are often innovative in their response to shortcomings in the legal
enforcement framework and pursue entrepreneurship as a substitute for absent or
maladaptive public institutions.1 There are also instances in which innovativeness
and entrepreneurship may suffer from overly strong property rights protections
(Gans and Persson 2013). An important contemporary example is intellectual
1The Sicilian Mafia and criminal organizations in Japan illustrate that these activities are not
necessarily negative for the economy, given the context within which they are conducted
(Milhaupt and West 2000; Bandiera 2003; Douhan and Henrekson 2010). Nevertheless, the
weaker the property rights, the more predatory the entrepreneurial activities are likely to be.
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property rights protection, which has been strengthened in recent years in ways that
are arguably too protective, most notably in the United States, increasing both the
cost and risk associated with innovative activity (Jaffe and Lerner 2004; Cohen
2005; Acs and Sanders 2012).
In practice, one must strike a difficult compromise within the legal system. On
the one hand, if protection is too weak or can be circumvented too easily (through
unproductive or destructive entrepreneurship), there is no incentive to introduce
innovations in the first place (Merrill et al. 2004; Acs and Szerb 2007; Baumol et al.
2007; Kauffman Foundation 2007). On the other hand, if protection is overly strong
—if its time frame is too long or if it is too easy to obtain even for inventions that
are not truly novel—the original innovator will be able to extract excessive
monopoly rents, making the economy less competitive and less innovative.
3.1.2 Reform Agenda
Although no country in the world can pride itself on having perfected the rule of
law, cross-country differences are substantial. As presented in column 1 of
Table 3.1, this is also true among EU countries. The former Soviet-bloc countries
score especially low on the rule of law, but this is also true for Greece and Italy and,
to a slightly lesser extent, for Spain and Portugal. The top countries are the Nordic,
Anglo-Saxon and Benelux nations. These are also the wealthiest EU countries. The
second column of the table reveals large differences in terms of the security of
property rights as well, and the order of countries is quite similar to the order for the
rule of law.
For citizens and economic agents to reap the full benefits of the rule of law, the
laws and regulations in question must be of high quality, and the government must
be sufficiently effective in maintaining the rule of law. The third and fourth indi-
cators in Table 3.1 show that the differences across EU countries are large in these
respects as well. However, it is noteworthy that the quality of the laws and regu-
lations in the laggard countries tend to be higher than the government’s effective-
ness at enforcing compliance. Arguably, this is not surprising. Adopting the right
laws is easier than enforcing them effectively. Furthermore, EU law compels
countries to do the former but has far less clout to enforce or ensure the latter.
Regarding the rule of law, the efficiency of government, and the protection of
property rights we see no alternative for the laggard countries but to do their utmost
to converge towards the level of the best-performing countries. Deficiencies in these
factors negatively impact all agents in the ecosystem’s skill structure and induce
people to conduct activities and keep their capital in the shadow economy. Even the
poorest EU member countries are higher medium-income countries, and neither the
VoC literature nor arguments à la Rodrik (2008) provide any support for the view
that these countries can compensate for these deficiencies through other institutional
measures.
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Table 3.1 The rule of law and the quality of government: four indicators for the EU member









Finland 100.0 8.98 95.1 91.9
Denmark 99.3 7.83 89.2 87.3
Sweden 96.8 7.82 88.8 89.4
Netherlands 96.5 8.07 89.9 88.8
Austria 95.9 8.07 82.6 81.7
Luxembourg 94.4 8.52 85.0 85.6
UK 94.2 8.70 84.0 90.1
Germany 93.3 7.73 87.2 86.7
Ireland 92.0 8.12 83.5 88.2
USA 87.4 7.25 79.5 76.3
Belgium 84.8 7.41 77.9 73.8
France 83.7 7.57 78.0 71.6
Estonia 81.2 6.97 68.1 86.2
Malta 77.2 6.74 67.6 72.1
Czech Rep. 75.5 5.01 67.5 70.1
Portugal 75.3 6.41 67.1 63.8
Cyprus 73.5 5.55 70.6 71.9
Slovenia 71.5 5.30 67.1 61.2
Spain 70.5 5.54 71.1 64.0
Lithuania 69.7 5.41 66.7 74.5
Latvia 68.7 5.99 66.1 73.7
Poland 67.5 5.54 62.0 71.0
Hungary 59.5 4.56 53.9 63.7
Slovakia 58.9 4.74 63.3 67.0
Greece 55.7 4.84 50.0 53.3
Italy 55.5 5.02 49.5 61.1
Croatia 54.9 4.65 58.3 54.7
Romania 50.9 4.93 39.0 59.5
Bulgaria 45.2 4.11 41.6 59.0
Note Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide
by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police,
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Security of property rights captures
the extent to which individuals have secure rights to property, including the fruits of their labor.
Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public and civil services and the
degree of their independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Regulatory
quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations that permit and promote private-sector development. All scores are
standardized from 0 to 100, where the value 100 is assigned to the leading country. Singapore is
the leading country for the 3rd and 4th measure
Source World Bank, World Governance Indicators 2015, and Gwartney et al. (2015) for security
of property rights
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3.2 Taxation
3.2.1 Preamble
The design of the tax system affects the net return to entrepreneurship both directly
and indirectly; it also affects the prevalence and activities of the other actors in the
ecosystem’s skill structure. The tax system determines a potential entrepreneur’s
risk-reward profile and, consequently, his or her incentives for undertaking entre-
preneurial activities. The literature has consistently found that the self-employed are
more responsive to taxes than employees (e.g., Carroll et al. 2000; Rosen 2005;
Heim 2010; Chetty et al. 2011; Harju and Kosonen 2013; Alstadsæter et al. 2014;
Kleven and Schultz 2014). The elasticity of taxable income is far higher for the
self-employed than for employees, which implies that higher taxes reduce the
supply of taxable income due to a combination of real effects and tax reporting.
However, the effects are often complex and sometimes counterintuitive. From a
theoretical point of view, we will focus on two main ways in which the tax system
affects entrepreneurial activity.2
The first is an absolute effect that influences the supply and effort of potential
entrepreneurs in the economy, as an absolute increase in the taxation of entrepre-
neurs lowers the (expected) after-tax reward. It also makes expansion financed by
retained earnings more difficult and negatively affects the liquidity position of
entrepreneurs. In sum, the absolute effect serves to frustrate entrepreneurial activ-
ities and impedes the emergence of new startups and the expansion of firms. The
second is a relative effect that influences an individual’s choice of occupation and
organizational form by altering the relative returns for different activities if the tax
favors one form of economic activity over another; thus, a higher tax rate may
encourage income shifting and may positively influence (some forms of)
entrepreneurship in the economy. A relative effect also occurs if the tax system
favors certain forms of savings and investments. To the extent that the optimal
financing and ownership structures differ across industries, firm type and firm age,
such non-neutralities affect incentives for entrepreneurship.3
2See Henrekson and Sanandaji (2016b).
3Two additional effects are of less importance for the discussion at hand: an evasion effect
influencing the willingness to become an entrepreneur to exploit opportunities to decrease the tax
burden, which arises if evading taxes on entrepreneurial income, either illegally or legally, is easier
than it would be for wage income. Self-employed entrepreneurs may be able to underreport income
by neglecting to register cash sales, overstating costs by recording private expenses as business
costs, or using informal agreements that are difficult for the tax authority to verify. Higher taxes
may therefore encourage self-employment, but tax avoidance opportunities become more difficult
to exploit as a business expands. Lastly, there is an insurance effect in the case of both proportional
and progressive taxation having a full loss offset, as such a scheme functions as insurance that
stimulates risk taking (Domar and Musgrave 1944). With respect to entrepreneurship, increased
taxation of the net return with a full loss offset will reduce the after-tax variance of profits and
therefore the risk associated with the business. If potential entrepreneurs are risk averse, this risk
reduction may stimulate entrepreneurship. By contrast, a progressive tax system with an imperfect
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While analyzing taxes on entrepreneurial income directly would be preferable,
such an analysis is complicated by the fact that no specific tax on income from
entrepreneurial effort exists in practice. Rather, this income is taxed in several
different forms, notably as labor income, business income, current capital income
(dividends and interest), or capital gains. These taxes may affect entrepreneurial
activities differently. A thorough analysis of the effects of taxation on
entrepreneurship must disentangle these effects, and we do so by enumerating and
discussing what we deem to be the key characteristics of a tax system favoring
innovative entrepreneurship and the ecosystem’s skill structure.
Regarding corporate taxation, a high tax rate on business profits discourages
equity financing and encourages debt financing if interest costs are tax-deductible
(Desai et al. 2003; Huizinga et al. 2008). To the extent that debt financing is less
costly and more readily available to larger firms, high corporate tax rates coupled
with tax-deductible interest payments disadvantage smaller firms and potential
entrepreneurs (Davis and Henrekson 1999). Taxing corporate profits also reduces
the retained earnings that can be used to expand the existing venture. Consequently,
taxing profits in small firms often leads to lower growth rates (Michaelas et al.
1999).
A high tax rate on dividends encourages a reliance on retained earnings to
finance expansion. Such a tax rate punishes new ventures, locks in retained earn-
ings, and traps capital in incumbent firms. Therefore, a high tax rate on dividends
obstructs the flow of capital to the most promising projects because it favors
incumbent ventures (Chetty and Saez 2005). Most of the economic return from
successful high-impact entrepreneurial firms accrues to owners in the form of a
dramatically increased value of their shares rather than as dividends or large interest
payments to the owners. Thus, the taxation of capital gains on stock holdings
greatly affects the incentives of potential high-impact entrepreneurs and their
(equity) financiers (Cumming 2005; Da Rin et al. 2006).
Employee stock options are the equivalent of promises of future ownership
stakes in the firm, which will be realized if the firm develops according to plan and
manages to achieve the prescribed objectives for value creation. The granting of
stock options can also be substituted for high wages to moderate costs at the
beginning of the lifecycle (Gompers and Lerner 2001; Bengtsson and Hand 2013).
Stock options can thus be used to encourage and reward individuals who supply
key competencies to a firm—the competent employees in the ecosystem’s skill
structure. In ideal circumstances, stock options provide incentives that closely
mimic direct ownership, but their productivity greatly depends on the tax code. If
gains on stock options are taxed as wage income, some of the incentive effect is lost
—particularly if the gains are subject to (uncapped) social security contributions
(Footnote 3 continued)
loss offset will deter entrepreneurial business entry since entrepreneurial income is more variable
than salaried income, which means that the average tax will be higher for entrepreneurs in a
progressive tax system (Gentry and Hubbard 2000).
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and the marginal tax rate on wage income is high. The situation changes dramat-
ically if an employee with stock options can defer the tax liability until the stocks
are eventually sold. The effectiveness of these stock options is further reinforced if
the employee suffers no tax consequences from the granting or exercise of the
option, and if the employee is taxed at a low capital gains rate when the acquired
stock is sold (Gilson and Schizer 2003).
The level and progressivity of labor taxation (including mandatory social
security contributions) also affect employees directly by determining the incentives
for work effort, labor supply (on the extensive and intensive margin), occupational
choice, career aspirations, and the propensity to upgrade and learn new skills
(Rosen 1983). Most obviously, high and progressive labor taxes lower the rate of
return on highly productive skills, and are therefore likely to impair the supply of
skilled workers.4 They also slow restructuring and the reallocation of people across
firms since it becomes costlier to achieve the net wage differential necessary to
induce a person to leave their current employment. Hence, high taxation of labor
income affects several of the categories in the skill structure, especially competent
employees and entrepreneurs. Of course, the supply of competent employees is also
affected by the tax incentives to acquire an adequate education, a question to which
we will return in Sect. 3.8.5
Regarding the role of venture capitalists in the ecosystem’s skill structure, we
should note that the tax systems of many countries evolved before the emergence of
complicated ownership structures involving private equity financing, such as ven-
ture capital (VC) and buyout firms.6 Sophisticated mechanisms were initially
needed to provide high-powered incentives for many actors in addition to the final
equity holders. In fact, the modern VC industry in the U.S. could not evolve until
the tax system was changed in key respects. Sharp reductions in the capital gains
tax and legislation pertaining to stock options around 1980 allowed the tax liability
to be deferred until stocks were sold rather than when the options were exercised.
Additionally, new legislation in 1979 allowed pension funds to invest in high-risk
securities that were issued by small or new companies and VC funds (Misher 1984;
Fenn et al. 1995).
We should emphasize here that important complementarities exist between
different tax rates. For example, the low effective taxation of gains on employee
stock options appears to be necessary to develop a large VC sector. In addition,
when channeling institutional capital into the entrepreneurial startup sector, finding
efficient substitutes for VC firms is difficult. Overall, to calculate the total effect of
4Although it is difficult to find direct evidence of such an effect, there is highly plausible indirect
evidence in the form of high estimates of the elasticity of taxable income at high income levels
(Gruber and Saez 2002; Saez et al. 2012).
5This issue is discussed at some length in Henrekson and Rosenberg (2001).
6Private equity (PE) ownership involves the following layers of ownership: private ownership
stakes by founders and key personnel in the portfolio companies, an ownership share by the PE
firm and the PE partners (often indirect), several investors’ stakes in the PE fund, and final
beneficiaries (often current or future retirees) of institutions investing in PE funds.
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taxation, one must consider the specific rules for depreciation and valuation in
corporate taxation and the taxation of interest income, dividends, capital gains, and
wealth. The effective total tax rate also depends on the ownership category. In many
developed countries, business ownership stakes that are directly held by individuals
and families have been taxed more heavily than other ownership stakes. The wave
of tax reforms that swept the OECD in the 1980s reduced many of these differences,
but those that remain provoke an endogenous response in the ownership structure of
the business sector to the tax-favored owner categories (Rydqvist et al. 2014). If
individual stock holdings are disfavored relative to institutional holdings and if
institutional investors are less willing to invest in small and new entrepreneurial
projects, entrepreneurial activity will be discouraged.
3.2.2 Reform Agenda
In line with the general argument articulated in Sect. 2.2, our contention is that the
tax system should strive for as much simplicity as possible rather than addressing
shortcomings by granting exceptions and tax breaks for specific ownership types or
industries. Tax breaks are often instituted for good reasons, and they may very well
appear justified when analyzed in isolation. However, they create complexities with
numerous drawbacks. First, they are vulnerable to tax-driven business models that
are legal but not in line with the spirit of the concession in question. Moreover,
highly complex systems lack in salience. For example, if economic actors can
realize a lower effective taxation than the statutory one, it becomes more difficult to
achieve the behavioral effects that policymakers would like to see (Chetty et al.
2009).
3.2.2.1 Taxation of Labor Income
As shown in the first column of Table 3.2, the highest marginal tax rates differ
greatly across the European Union—spanning from 16% in Hungary to 57% in
Sweden. However, the highest marginal tax rate is not necessarily the most relevant
measure. One should also examine the total marginal tax wedge, which is defined as
the share of total labor cost at the margin and consists of the sum of mandatory
social security contributions paid by the employer and/or the employee and the
marginal income tax rate. This is performed for different relevant family constel-
lations in columns 2–4 of Table 3.2. In a country like Belgium, as much as
two-thirds of total labor cost consists of income taxes and social security contri-
butions, while the share in Poland is only about half as large.
Institutional complementarity can enable a country to tax labor income more
heavily without suffering from increased distortionary effects. Most importantly,
high labor taxation has less detrimental effects if access to valuable subsidies in
cash or in-kind (e.g., child care and pension rights) is tied to employment and if
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each spouse’s income is taxed separately rather than jointly (Lindbeck 1982). The
importance of the latter effect becomes obvious when comparing the third and
fourth columns in Table 3.2 for Belgium and Sweden.
In fact, as mentioned (and as shown in Fig. 2.2 in Sect. 2.1), Sweden has the
highest employment rate in the entire EU, but this does not mean that its excessive
taxation of high incomes is costless. In fact, a reform to remove taxations of the
highest income levels in Sweden would probably more than finance itself (Sørensen
2010). As it stands, these taxes can be expected to have deleterious effects, par-
ticularly in the most advanced parts of the economy. In all likelihood, Sweden is
successful in employment terms despite rather than because of its high labor taxes,
which can only be borne because of the overall quality of the institutional envi-
ronment. Countries with poorer institutional quality should therefore not see
Sweden as a role model in this respect. Poor countries that would like to increase
their tax revenue must begin by improving the quality of their basic institutions.
Table 3.2 Top marginal tax rate on labor income, and marginal rate of income tax plus employee
and employer contributions less cash benefits (tax wedge), 2015












Austria 50.0 60.5 42.2 60.5
Belgium 45.3 66.3 68.5 65.5
Czech Rep. 20.1 48.6 48.6 48.6
Denmark 55.8 42.0 55.8 42.0
Estonia 19.7 41.2 41.2 41.2
Finland 49.1 55.5 58.5 56.2
France 54.0 59.3 59.8 56.4
Germany 47.5 60.2 44.3 57.7
Greece 50.0 47.6 54.8 47.6
Hungary 16.0 49.0 49.0 49.0
Ireland 47.0 55.8 55.8 37.7
Italy 48.8 56.0 63.3 56.6
Luxembourg 43.6 55.5 55.5 53.0
Netherlands 49.2 46.7 52.1 46.7
Poland 20.9 37.2 37.2 37.2
Portugal 50.3 53.9 60.8 51.1
Slovakia 21.7 46.5 46.5 46.5
Slovenia 39.0 51.0 60.4 43.6
Spain 46.0 49.9 38.0 49.9
Sweden 57.0 48.3 67.3 48.3
UK 45.0 40.2 49.0 40.2
USA 46.3 43.6 43.6 34.3
Note AW Average wage. The marginal tax wedge refers to the principal earner with an income of
100% of AW and the secondary earner with an income of 67% of AW in the rightmost column
Source OECD, Taxing Wages 2014–2015
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Labor income is taxed at low rates in most Eastern European countries.
Nonetheless, these countries have large underground economies, while the
employment rate is low, as is the rate of improvement-driven opportunity
entrepreneurship. This strongly suggests that factors other than high taxes on labor
are binding constraints for this cluster of countries. The situation is different for
several of the Mediterranean countries; they also suffer from low employment and
entrepreneurship, whereas the underground economy tends to be large. In these
countries, as well as in Belgium and France, labor taxation is a clear impediment.
Reform is therefore needed to combine lower labor taxes with a stricter coupling of
subsidies, such as child care and pension rights, to employment. The latter issues
will be addressed in Sect. 3.4.
3.2.2.2 Taxation of Corporate Income
As shown in Fig. 3.1, there are large differences across EU countries in the statutory
corporate tax rate, ranging from 34% in France to 12.5% in Ireland. In the case of
corporate taxation, we see no reason for the European Union to strive for con-
vergence across EU countries. In this case, healthy institutional competition among
member countries is preferred.
This does not preclude an important role for the European Union. First, the
Union must be adamant about ending blatant institutional arbitrage and sweetheart
deals negotiated between national governments and large multinational corpora-
tions. Additionally, the Union should strive to reduce and ideally remove the dis-
crepancies in member countries between statutory and effective corporate income
tax rates, which may result from tax-reducing depreciation rules, inventory valua-












Fig. 3.1 The statutory corporate tax rate in EU countries and the U.S., 2016. Source OECD and
Eurostat.
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removal would create transparency and contribute to leveling the playing field for
all firms regardless of their size, industry or nationality. Competition among
member states is good, but it should be competition on corporate tax rates and not
on complex, opaque fiscal deals and schemes. Member states should treat all firms
equally.
3.2.2.3 Taxation of Dividends and Capital Gains
The return on entrepreneurship largely accrues in the form of dividends and capital
gains from ownership stakes in the firm. The standard tax rates on dividends and
capital gains among EU countries and the United States are given in Appendix
Table A.1 and reveal major differences. More importantly, there are
country-specific, highly idiosyncratic divergences from these standard rates. These
divergences depend on factors such as the holding period, the size of the firm,
whether the firm is private or public (i.e., traded on a stock exchange), whether a
person is an active or passive owner, whether the firm and/or the investor qualifies
for inclusion in a tax-favored scheme (e.g., a scheme geared towards encouraging
innovative startup activity), and the tax status of the body (a physical or a juridical
person, etc.) receiving the capital income.
As exemplified by Grant (2016), such differences can be huge and vary sub-
stantially across countries. In Sweden, the dividend and capital gains tax rates can
vary between 20 and 60% for physical persons depending on circumstances,
whereas the Irish dividend tax rate varies between 20 and 40% and the Irish capital
gains tax rate can be reduced from 33% to zero under certain conditions.7 On the
other hand, the variation is small in the Netherlands, Poland, and Estonia; in the
latter country, dividends are taxed at 0% and capital gains at 20%.
The complexities should be removed when possible. Instead, countries should
aim for dividend and capital gains tax rates with few exceptions and few (opaque)
concessionary schemes. Here, the Eastern European countries, such as Poland and
Estonia, have exemplary models in which the tax rates are at reasonable levels and
the effective tax rate is largely independent of other circumstances. Arguably, the
reason for this clarity is that the design of these systems date back no further than
1989. A radical redesign from the ground up is probably not feasible in older
member states, but they should nevertheless strive for similar improvements to
simplicity and transparency.
3.2.2.4 Taxation of Stock Options
Observations from the history of the American VC sector indicates that stock
options are widely used when they are advantageous from a tax perspective. The
7See OECD (2015a) for details regarding the taxation of income from SMEs.
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contractual design of financial instruments constitutes a good fit for the issues
facing the VC-funded entrepreneurial sector. Therefore, the effective tax treatment
of option contracts may in itself be a major determinant to the size of the
VC-funded entrepreneurial sector. Henrekson and Sanandaji (2016a) calculate the
effective tax rate on stock options in various countries given a typical scenario. The
tax rates for the EU countries included in their study as well as those for the United
States and Hong Kong are presented in Table 3.3, revealing a large variation in tax
rates. The VC sector is extremely small in most countries where the tax rate is very
high, as will become clear in the next section (see Table 3.4, in particular), while
the low-tax countries (Hong Kong and the United States) have a large and highly
dynamic VC sector.
Lowered taxation of gains on employee stock options in the startup sector is
likely to be necessary in many countries, both to lure talented people away from
traditional careers in incumbent firms and to channel institutional capital into the
entrepreneurial sector, which should be mediated by a professional VC sector. This
policy would narrowly target the entrepreneurial sector rather than entail broad tax
cuts (Gilson and Schizer 2003) if designed to apply only to startups receiving
VC-funding, a small but strategic sector of the economy. The policy lowers the
effective taxation of startups that are screened by venture capitalists willing to
invest their own funds without requiring the government to determine which firms
are entrepreneurial. Innovative startups can then be favored without needing broad
capital gains tax cuts.8 A tax break that targets human capital in this segment would
promote innovative entrepreneurship without the high fiscal cost of broad capital
gains tax cuts. Moreover, broad-based capital gains tax cuts do not shift capital
from passive investments to private equity, unlike tax breaks on stock options and
other instruments used by the VC sector.
Table 3.3 Effective tax rate
on stock options in selected
European countries, the U.S.,
and Hong Kong, 2012
Country Tax rate, % Country Tax rate, %
Ireland 7.4 Finland 51.3
USA 15.0 Switzerland 51.5
Hong Kong 15.0 Spain 52.0
Netherlands 25.0 Sweden 54.3
France 29.9 Denmark 55.3
UK 28.0 Portugal 56.5
Germany 47.5 Italy 72.2
Norway 50.8
Source Henrekson and Sanandaji (2016a)
8A mere 0.1–0.2% of all firms in the U.S. receive early-stage financing from specialized venture
capitalists (Puri and Zarutskie 2012), but they constitute the majority of firms that are sufficiently
successful to go public (Kaplan and Lerner 2010).
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Table 3.4 Venture capital investments as a share of GDP, and the ease of getting credit in EU
countries and the U.S., 2015






























Note aFor VC-investments, values for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are a Baltic average. The
ranking of economies on the ease of getting credit is determined by their distance to the leading
country for getting credit. These scores are the distance to frontier score for the sum of the strength
of legal rights index (range 0–10); and the depth of credit information index (range 0–8). New
Zealand is the leading country
Source Invest Europe (2016, p. 43) for venture capital and World Bank, Doing Business 2016 for
ease of getting credit
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3.3 Regulations Governing Savings, Capital and Finance
3.3.1 Preamble
A high savings rate in a country does not guarantee the availability of financing for
innovative and growth-oriented entrepreneurship, especially not in the early, pre-
carious phase of the firm’s lifecycle. In fact, some of the countries with the highest
savings rates are the least entrepreneurial, whereas the United States has a notori-
ously low savings rate and a vibrant entrepreneurial sector. The composition of
savings—not just its volume—also sways potential entrepreneurship activity in the
economy. As we have already demonstrated, entrepreneurial activity hinges on
accessing and raising the right kind of capital.
Numerous studies reveal that a lack of access to capital is the most significant
obstacle for many business ventures (e.g., van Auken 1999 and Parker 2009). In the
EU, entrepreneurs and SMEs rank financing as their second most important concern
after administrative burdens (European Commission 2008), and the highly devel-
oped financial system of the United States has indeed been cited as a central reason
for the emergence of its successful entrepreneurial economy (Kauffman Foundation
2007, p. 34). However, many startups do not require much capital, and financial
constraints are therefore not much of a problem (Hurst and Lusardi 2004; Shane
2008, p. 79). Advances in ICT have reduced minimum capital requirements in
many markets (Baumol et al. 2007, p. 236). As it stands, capital tends to constrain
high-growth firms more than other firms because they often require sizable infu-
sions of external equity to sustain growth (Baumol et al. 2007, p. 205).
Notably, the success of a startup relies on its access to equity financing, a
reliance which increases (relative to debt) with the degree of risk. Ceteris paribus,
small and newly established firms are more dependent on equity financing than
large, well-established firms since it is more difficult for outside financiers to assess
the viability and profitability of the venture. Therefore, entrepreneurial startups
usually struggle to raise funds from large financial institutions and are forced to rely
on insider and internal funding in their infancy. Any arrangement that channels
savings and asset control to large institutional investors is therefore likely to hamper
the supply of financial capital to potential entrepreneurs.
By contrast, research strongly suggests that incentives for individual wealth
accumulation would likely increase entrepreneurial activity (Nykvist 2008; Parker
2009). Wealth-constrained would-be entrepreneurs are unable to forcibly signal
their project’s worth to outside investors by means of making sizeable equity
infusions of their own. More private savings would lessen the inherent problem
caused by such asymmetric information, and, if needed, enable entrepreneurs to
fully finance the firm until organic growth based on retained earnings is possible.
Furthermore, informal investors, such as business angels, may fill the gap between
internal funding and formal VC financing (to varying degrees in different coun-
tries). Research shows that the presence of these informal investors is crucial in
overcoming liquidity constraints (Ho and Wong 2007). The United Kingdom in
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particular has used tax relief and generous deductions to encourage business angel
investments; see, e.g., Boyns et al. (2003) and Mason (2006).
Although the importance of the formal VC industry has increased over time, its
presence is still rather modest in the EU (Bygrave and Hunt 2004; Lerner and Tåg
2013) with many entrepreneurial firms being too small for VC funding. However,
venture capital is important for high-performing and high-growth entrepreneurial
firms (Cumming 2012). It is often superior to bank finance since it also provides
key expertise and access to networks that are important to entrepreneurial high-risk
firms (Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2004a; Ho and Wong 2007). In this respect, it is
troubling that the VC industry is less developed in Europe than in the U.S. (Bottazzi
and Da Rin 2002; Da Rin et al. 2006), possibly because European business owners
are less prone to accept a loss of control, which is a normal consequence of venture
capital support (OECD 1998). It may be for this reason that U.S. firms grow faster
than their European counterparts (Scarpetta et al. 2002; Henrekson and Sanandaji
2016a).
Appreciating the role of the VC industry in the entrepreneurial ecosystem also
explains why governmental attempts to compensate for deficient private financing
of innovative entrepreneurship—especially of the early-stage variety—are unlikely
to be successful.9 Any such support system must contain elements of rationing and
selection in order to avoid the moral hazard problems of unmanageable proportions,
and as emphasized in the discussion of targeted support in Sect. 2.2, no recipe
exists that dictates how to “pick the winners” and support the right investments. By
contrast, the process of evaluation in the private VC industry is highly complex and
often includes tacit judgments. Granted, industry actors, despite their specialization,
are at best moderately successful in picking the winners among high-risk projects
(Gompers and Lerner 2004; Birch 2006; Svensson 2008; Gompers et al. 2009), but
there is little empirical evidence to suggest that politically controlled organizations
are better placed in this respect (Baumol et al. 2007, p. 220). Instead, such orga-
nizations might—directly or indirectly, openly or furtively, partly or completely—
base their decisions on political rather than commercial criteria and therefore
underperform.10
Moreover, decision making by business angels and VC investors is often also a
matter of judgment in which the criteria are largely tacit. To have public agencies
9For example, tax revenues can be used to directly provide venture capital to the market, either
through state-controlled organizations or together with private actors. In particular, governments
could support the supply of early stage (seed) capital—which the formal venture capital industry
typically does not provide—through public interventions.
10Baumol et al. (2007) assert that the Advanced Technology Program (ATP), administered by the
Commerce Department in the United States, only supported ventures that also attracted private
money, and there is some evidence that this has been successful. The largest U.S. program is the
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. Siegel et al. (2003) conclude that both ATP
and SBIR have been successful, while Lerner (2009) is more skeptical and describes many
government support programs that have failed due to ill-conceived designs, incompetence among
government officials and fussy goals. The only countries in which he finds that government
support schemes have been a definite success are Singapore and Israel.
3.3 Regulations Governing Savings, Capital and Finance 39
use similar criteria does not mesh with the requirement of treating all citizens
equally under the law. Finally, failure is an inherent part of entrepreneurship, and
private investors consciously assume such risk. It is more difficult for elected
politicians who handle taxpayers’ money to motivate such risk-taking and the
inevitable losses in numerous projects.
3.3.2 Reform Agenda
As a long-term solution, the best way to ensure the financing of entrepreneurial
firms is likely to be the pursuit of policies that encourage private wealth accumu-
lation in forms that do not preclude the assets from being used as equity in
entrepreneurial ventures.11 However, there is currently a strong tendency to intro-
duce or increase the use of funded pension systems both in the private and public
sectors, and there is little reason to believe that this trend will be reversed. In
Sweden, for example, collectively agreed supplementary pension schemes cover
virtually all tenured employees with payments into those systems amounting to
approximately 10% of taxable labor income (Riksbanken 2014; Svensk Försäkring
2015).12 Total assets amount to some two-thirds of Swedish GDP and 130% of
household disposable income. Aggregate pension fund assets as a share of GDP are
especially large in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, but they are also high
in Ireland, Finland and Denmark, while they are still small in the Eastern European
countries and in Germany, France and Italy (OECD 2015b).
Since a progressively larger share of savings goes into pension funds,13 there is a
growing need for at least part of these assets to be invested in entrepreneurial firms
and not just in real estate, public stocks and high-rated bonds. Since large financial
institutions can rarely invest directly in small and new firms, a bridging interme-
diating role must be provided by a professional VC sector, as discussed in
Sect. 3.3.1. As revealed in the first column of Table 3.4,14 the differences here are
substantial across Europe, with Denmark and Luxembourg clearly leading, whereas
the Eastern European and the Mediterranean countries for which there are data are
located at the bottom.
Here, policymakers could be inspired by the U.S. experience of the 1970s and
1980s, and adopt a broad-based policy approach: an encouraging legal framework
that combines tax cuts in capital gains with legislation allowing pension funds to
11Pelikan (1988) provides forceful arguments supporting this view.
12Marginal payments are at least 38% on the part of wages, which only slightly exceeds the
average wage for full-time workers (including a tax of 24% on collectively agreed pension
premiums).
13See Ebbinghaus (2011) regarding the trend away from pay-as-you-go and towards the privati-
zation of pension systems in Europe.
14Hong Kong and Norway are not included in Table 3.4. According to Lerner and Tåg (2013), the
sizes of their VC sectors were 0.23 and 0.053% of GDP, respectively.
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invest in high-risk securities issued by small and new firms as well as VC funds
(Gompers and Lerner 1999; cf. Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2004a, b). Additionally, as
discussed in Sect. 3.2, effective tax treatments of options contracts are necessary to
enable VC firms and other actors in the entrepreneurial ecosystem to design the
appropriate incentive contracts for founders and other key personnel needed to
build innovative firms (Henrekson and Rosenberg 2001). Without such opportu-
nities, a sizeable and efficient VC sector cannot develop.
By contrast, debt financing is unlikely to be a viable alternative to external equity
investments in the early entrepreneurial phase since such financing presupposes
positive cash flows and low risk ventures—meaning that innovative entrepreneur-
ship is not favored compared to activities with low risk and assets that can be
collateralized. A comparison of the first and second column of Table 3.4 reveals
that many of the countries with low scores on the size of external equity investment
activity rank highly regarding the ease of getting credit (e.g., Romania, Hungary
and Bulgaria). While some economies have traditionally been characterized as
bank-centered—Germany being the archetypical case—this has changed pro-
foundly over the last two decades. Bank lending is no longer a viable option for
financing high-risk innovative entrepreneurship that does not occur within the
boundaries of large firms. Thus, bank financing and monitoring is not a viable
alternative to institutional reform that would pave the way for external equity
investment.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that venture capitalists and other
early-phase equity investors only are ownership specialists up to a certain point in
the entrepreneurial ecosystem, since a highly successful entrepreneurial firm will
reach a point at which it may be appropriate to sell the firm. That said, the existence
of a viable market for corporate control later in the firm lifecycle matters for
early-stage entrepreneurs, since this market affects the expected future value of
embarking on an entrepreneurial venture (Norbäck and Persson 2009, 2012).
There are three principal ways in which an entrepreneurial exit can be done. The
first is through a trade sale, i.e., being acquired by an incumbent firm that wants to
gain access to new technologies and innovation (or just eliminate a future com-
petitor), which is quite common in countries such as the Netherlands. The second
way is by going public through an IPO, which is possible if there is a sizeable
public stock market. The third way is by turning to buyout firms (the secondary
market equivalent of VC firms). This option is contingent on the existence of a
buyout sector through which pension savings can be channeled to the business
sector in the form of equity investment. As shown in Table 3.5, there are large
cross-country differences in the size of public stock markets and buyout sectors.
These sectors are generally small in countries with small VC sectors and vice versa.
Hence, they are quite large in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the Nordic countries, and
the Netherlands, but small in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean countries. This
hints at strong complementarities between the early- and late-stage vehicles for
corporate control and prompts us to look for underlying causes of the absence of
these markets.
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Table 3.5 Buyout investment and market capitalization as a percentage of GDP in EU countries
and the U.S., 2015



















Estonia 0.013a 10.1 (2012)
Latvia 0.013a 4.0 (2012)
Lithuania 0.013a 9.3 (2012)
Austria 0.008 22.2







Note aFor buyout investment, values for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are a Baltic average. Market
capitalization is the share price times the number of shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies
are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country’s stock exchanges at the end of
the year. Listed companies do not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective
investment vehicles. Data are missing for some of the EU countries
Source For buyout: Invest Europe (2016, p. 44) for EU countries and American Investment
Council and World Bank for the U.S. For market capitalization: World Federation of Exchanges
database; extracted from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (2006–14) for
all countries except for Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Source Denmark: “World Development
Indicators 2014”. Source Sweden: Riksbanken and Statistics Sweden. Source Finland: Finlands
Bank and Statistikcentralen
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One likely reason for small public stock markets is the weak protection of
minority investors, but a more fundamental reason for underdevelopment in each of
these areas is probably weak property rights protection, discussed in Sect. 3.1
(Levine 2005). Without such protection, no actors are likely to have sufficient
incentives to take the risks required for successful corporate control and guidance at
any stage of the firm lifecycle unless that agent has total control and owns 100% of
the equity. Under such circumstances, pension savings and other institutional
capital would be barred from access to ownership stakes in the corporate sector.
3.4 The Organization of Labor Markets and Social
Insurance Systems
3.4.1 Preamble
Legislation and regulations pertaining to labor markets and wage setting influence
incentives for entrepreneurship since contracting freedom becomes constrained. It
therefore curtails possible combinations of factors of production and the best use of
the various functions in the skill structure, notably those related to competent
employees. Labor security mandates fall more heavily on younger, smaller, and less
capital-intensive employers—categories in which entrepreneurial firms are over-
represented. Severance pay and strict regulations governing the order of dismissal
in the case of redundancy are factors that keep entrepreneurs from adjusting their
workforce in response to market fluctuations and changes in required skills, thereby
increasing the risk of their projects (Audretsch et al. 2002). Such lack of flexibility
may become detrimental to the overall economy, making it less adaptable to
changes. In addition, labor market regulation can influence entrepreneurial activity
by affecting the relative advantage of being an employee; far-reaching employment
protection legislation increases an employee’s opportunity cost of changing
employers or leaving a secure salaried job to become self-employed (Ho and Wong
2007; van Stel et al. 2007).
Less stringent legislation for temporary employment contracts would enable an
important channel for job creation. However, from the ecosystem perspective, this
is a second-best solution since staff on temporary contracts will be less motivated to
invest in firm-specific skills and commit less strongly to the firm than employees on
permanent contracts.15 Thus, it becomes less likely that the firm will be able to
attract workers who have highly valued skills or are inclined to develop such skills.
Hence, a large discrepancy in the degree of protection between permanent and
15Prima facie, one may infer that permanent contracts are of little value in high-risk entrepreneurial
ventures, as the contract is not secure anyway. However, unless the firm offers a permanent
contract, the employee runs the risk of being dismissed when the temporary contract expires even
if the venture is successful.
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temporary contracts offers a comparative advantage to low-skill industries in which
employees are highly substitutable. Such industries tend to be less innovative and
have lower productivity.
Research has found that labor market regulations shape the level of nascent
entrepreneurship more than differences in entry regulations, with the result that
entrepreneurship is higher in countries in which hiring and dismissing employees is
relatively easy and inexpensive (Niehof 1999; OECD 2003; van Stel et al. 2007). In
addition, labor market deregulation can and has stimulated entrepreneurial activity
in many OECD countries (OECD 1998, 2000). Europe’s stricter employment
protection legislation may partly explain its lower frequency of new, rapidly
growing firms relative to the United States (Baumol et al. 2007, p. 210 and 222).16
The social security system is closely linked to the regime governing the labor
market. Public income insurance systems in combination with strict labor security
legislation tend to penalize individuals who assume entrepreneurial risk
(Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen 2001). This is because these systems confer a relative
advantage on employees with many social security benefits—such as disability,
sickness, unemployment and pension benefits—being explicitly linked to formal
employment. These benefits further increase the opportunity cost of leaving a
tenured position as an employee and thus reduce the incentives for entrepreneurship
(Audretsch et al. 2002).
Many are unwilling to forgo a large part of their social protection in exchange
for an uncertain and volatile entrepreneurial income. Making parts of social
insurance benefits “portable”—e.g., by decoupling health insurance—between jobs
and between regular employment and self-employment would mitigate this effect.
However, even if it were possible to “generalize” the social security system, the
self-employed and owners/managers of small entrepreneurial firms would still be
unable to make practical use of the full extent of the system’s benefits, such as those
related to parental or sick leave.
Generous unemployment benefits naturally discourage the unemployed from
becoming self-employed, and in countries in which the unemployed receive a high
proportion of their former wage, the rate of new firm formation is lower (Nickell
1997; Delmar et al. 2005; Koellinger and Minniti 2009). However, as already noted
in Sect. 2.1, going from unemployment to self-employment is oftentimes a form of
necessity entrepreneurship, which is unlikely to have many positive economic
effects.
16Stringent labor market regulations thus deter and impede business activities but may simulta-
neously boost self-employment due to evasive measures. To circumvent stringent regulations,
potential entrepreneurs can choose to become self-employed themselves. They could also decide to
eschew hiring employees in favor of cooperating in networks with other self-employed individuals
since no labor security is mandated for the self-employed and compensation and working hours are
unregulated. However, this type of self-employment should not be interpreted as a sign of
entrepreneurial dynamism but instead as a costly, albeit necessary, strategy to evade onerous
regulation. Part of the increase in self-employment in recent years in many highly regulated
economies is likely driven by such considerations (Liebregts 2016).
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3.4.2 Reform Agenda
3.4.2.1 Employment Protection Legislation
Figure 3.2 shows the stringency of employment protection legislation (EPL) in the
EU countries and in the United States for temporary contracts (y-axis) and per-
manent contracts (x-axis). The two measures reveal considerable positive correla-
tion (r = 0.46). The Anglo-Saxon countries stand out as having the least stringent
EPL by far, even though most other countries have liberalized their legislation for
permanent employment in recent decades (Skedinger 2010; Martin and Scarpetta
2012). For temporary contracts, Sweden and Germany stand out for their substantial
liberalization over the past 20 years; notably, these are two of the top-performing
EU countries in terms of employment (see Fig. 2.2). They also rank among the
countries with the highest share of temporary employment. In Sweden, as much as
56% of employed 15–24-year-olds were on temporary contracts in 2015 (OECD
2016).
The Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece) have also lib-
eralized their temporary employment legislation, and even though it remains
comparatively stringent, the share of employed 15–24-year olds on temporary

















































Fig. 3.2 Stringency of employment protection legislation for workers on permanent and
temporary contracts in EU countries and the U.S., 2013. Note The scale of the index is 0–6,
where 6 represents the most stringent regulation. 2013 is the latest available year. The index for
permanent employment is the index for individual and permanent dismissals. Source OECD/IAB
Employment Protection Database, 2013 update
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contrast, all Eastern European countries have increased the stringency of their
legislation related to temporary contracts, which is noteworthy given their generally
weak employment performance. Overall, legislation with respect to both types of
contracts remains quite strict in most Mediterranean and Continental European
countries.
Policymakers in several European countries are aware that the EPL may be too
stringent; to mitigate the negative effect, they have instituted firm-size thresholds
below which labor regulations are less onerous. Again, such a policy of exceptions
can be criticized on neutrality grounds since, in practice, this is the equivalent of a
tax on firm growth. Indeed, it has been revealed that firms are reluctant to grow
beyond the size threshold in Germany (Autio et al. 2007), France (Garicano et al.
2016), Portugal (Braguinsky et al. 2011), and Italy (Schivardi and Torrini 2008).17
Thus, firms are incentivized to remain small, and many entrepreneurs will never
discover that they could have become high-impact entrepreneurs because they do
not even try. That said, stringent employment regulations may create strong
incentives for actors in the skill structure to devise arrangements to circumvent the
regulations. Important symptoms of such attempts to create flexibility in several
European countries include increased self-employment, the emergence of an
underground economy in which the government does not or cannot enforce regu-
lations, and an increased reliance on temporary employment. Additionally, firms
may remain small to avoid unionization and the obligation to sign collective
agreements, thus benefitting from greater freedom of contracting.
Importantly, neither spontaneously evolved evasive measures nor policy mea-
sures enacted to ease the negative effect of an overly stringent EPL (either through a
reliance on thresholds or temporary contracts) are likely to improve the workings of
the ecosystem’s skill structure or the likelihood of the type of high-productivity
structural transformation necessary to enhance social welfare. Instead, these mea-
sures tend to create a system in which many small firms without the ability or
aspiration for high growth exist side by side with large firms and government-
owned firms that are better equipped to handle a stringent EPL. Outsiders remain
outsiders and insiders are locked up in “gilded cages”. This dual labor market is
unlikely to be inclusive for entrants, or conducive to innovation and high-skill
entrepreneurial venturing. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.3, which shows a negative
relationship between the overall strictness of EPL and the rate of high-growth
expectation early-stage entrepreneurship. There are two clear outliers, Lithuania and
Latvia, which may suggest that EPL is less binding in practice in these countries
because of mitigating complementary institutions.18
17In Germany, the administrative cost based on the design of the regulatory framework rises
sharply for firms with 50 employees or more. When French firms reach 50 employees, they must
form work councils, provide more union representation and face higher firing costs. Portugal and
Italy have important regulatory limits already at 15 employees with similar growth-impeding
effects.
18r = −0.43 if Latvia and Lithuania are excluded, otherwise r = −0.31.
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If the goal is to make the European Union more inclusive, innovative and
entrepreneurial, it is highly advisable that the most regulated countries reduce the
stringency of their EPL for permanent contracts. A competently implemented lib-
eralization will reduce job security but increase employment security for workers,
as labor demand will increase and more opportunities will be created in the labor
market. That said, the impact and strictness of employment protection legislation
depends on a complex combination of components, such as grounds for individual
dismissal, redundancy procedures, mandated periods of advanced notice, severance
payments, special requirements for collective dismissals, rules favoring disadvan-
taged groups, and so forth. For liberalization to have the desired results, countries
must develop their own strategies to avoid jeopardizing the process, ideally by
considering and possibly emulating the paths already taken by similar countries.
This also presupposes the implementation of complementary social insurance
institutions.
3.4.2.2 Social Insurance Systems
In principle, providing insurance for unfavorable outcomes can encourage indi-



































































Fig. 3.3 The strictness of employment protection and high-growth expectation early-stage
entrepreneurial activity, 2010–13. Note Both variables are averaged over the four years 2010–13.
Permanent EPL is given a weight of 2/3 and temporary EPL a weight of 1/3. Source Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor and OECD/IAB Employment Protection Database, 2013 update
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less costly, e.g., through an extensive and generous public social insurance system
that also includes generous unemployment benefits (Fig. 3.4). This is a valid the-
oretical point shown formally by Sinn (1996), but it is an open question as to
whether it is empirically important. Furthermore, the point no longer holds in labor
markets in which job security is closely linked to job tenure; ultimately, what
matters is the opportunity cost, i.e., how much an employee must sacrifice in terms
of income and security if he or she transfers to self-employment or a risky job in an
entrepreneurial firm.
For a tenured employee with a low-risk employer, the opportunity cost is high in
many countries in which important benefits are tied to employment.
Company-specific health insurance is an obvious example of such a benefit; another
is accumulated pension assets, which may be difficult to transfer when switching
employer and/or industry. To the extent that this is true, the mobility of (especially
older) workers across firms is hampered, and the hiring of the elderly unemployed
is discouraged.19 Decoupling these and other benefits from employment would
increase labor flexibility and lessen the risk that workers and potential entrepreneurs
become “trapped” in large companies by reducing fears of losing adequate health
insurance and other important employment benefits. In addition, supplementary
pension plans should be made fully actuarial and portable. Making social security












Fig. 3.4 The net replacement rate of unemployment benefits in EU countries and the U.S., 2014.
Source OECD
19Supplementary pension plans that are not fully actuarial and individualized often contain ele-
ments of redistribution and risk-sharing across individuals in a group, like white-collar workers in
a certain industry. In addition, the pension benefit level is often disproportionately tied to the wage
level achieved towards the end of an employee’s professional career, making elderly employees
unwilling to change to lower paid jobs even if that would mean that their career would be
prolonged and the final retirement age would be deferred.
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mobility of workers in Europe, since being tied to a job in a firm also implies being
tied to a specific location.
In this manner, public welfare systems can also reduce the need for stringent and
costly employment protection legislation by replacing mandated security at the firm
level, something which would arguably increase the acceptance of labor market
liberalizations in many EU countries. An important role model in this respect is the
flexicurity system of Denmark in which generous welfare protection and opportu-
nities for retraining are combined with weak job security mandates (Andersen
2005). By contrast, a Swedish employee who voluntarily gives up a tenured
position for self-employment may ultimately have no more security than what is
provided by (means-tested) social welfare; in effect, the public income insurance
systems and the employment security legislation tend to penalize individuals who
assume entrepreneurial risk. Thus, the opportunity cost of giving up a tenured
position in Denmark is substantially lower than in Sweden.
While the specifics can and will vary, we can infer that an important component
of a policy that makes society more innovative and entrepreneurial involves making
the individual’s social insurances as portable as possible when changing jobs and
moving between salaried employment and self-employment. This should be the
case regardless of whether the insurance is public, paid by the individual herself, or
paid by the employer based on individual or collective (union) agreement. One
example of how to achieve this portability is the Austrian reform of 2003, which
converted uncertain firing costs for employers into a system of individual savings
accounts, funded by an employer-paid payroll tax (Hofer 2007). This system
guarantees the employer certainty about the cost of any future dismissal when a
person is first hired, while workers do not lose their entitlement to severance pay
should they quit to take a new job.
At the same time, an efficient flexicurity model must encourage the retraining of
redundant workers, possibly in the dual sense that training should be supplied and
that people should be obliged to accept it to draw unemployment benefits. Yet for
the model to function properly, unemployment benefits cannot be so high that they
reduce incentives for future job search for workers who become unemployed.
Figure 3.4 reveals considerable variation in the net replacement rate of unem-
ployment benefits across European countries. The incentive effects of a certain
replacement rate depend on other complementary rules and institutions, particularly
the maximum number of days during which benefits can be received, the scope for
declining job offers and retraining programs, and whether the recipient can be
obligated to accept a job offer even if that entails moving to another location or
commuting long distances.
3.4.2.3 Conclusions on the Organization of Labor Markets
The most important channel by which labor market institutions affect
entrepreneurship is through their influence on the supply of skilled workers. Given
the large worker flows required in a dynamic entrepreneurial ecosystem, institutions
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should facilitate the recruitment of workers with the necessary competencies. Here,
as we have seen, several institutional complementarities come into play.
Importantly, this requires the removal of onerous employment protection legisla-
tion, as this discourages potential high-growth firms from expanding. Furthermore,
social security institutions should enable the portability of tenure rights and pension
plans, as well as a full decoupling of health insurance from the current employer. It
should be stressed that to be as efficient as possible, these reforms should not be
made in isolation but as part of a comprehensive reform package that also includes
other areas, especially tax policy and competition policy, as discussed in Sects. 3.2
and 3.5.
3.5 Regulation of Goods and Service Markets
3.5.1 Preamble
Natural entry barriers such as scale economies and capital requirements affect the
workings of the actors in the ecosystem’s skill structure, but artificial barriers
created by governments are also important factors when considering the ease of
starting a business (Begley et al. 2005; Dana 1990; Djankov and Murrell 2002).
While environmental, health and safety regulations are often well motivated,
competition policies that rely on excessive rules and procedures may discourage
potential entrepreneurs (Dana 1990; Gnyawali and Fogel 1994; Djankov et al.
2003; Begley et al. 2005) and hamper the process of creative destruction (La Porta
et al. 1997; Caballero and Hammour 2000; Desai et al. 2003).
Arguably, most damaging are restrictions and prohibitions against entry into
certain sectors of the economy (such as health care) as well as administrative costs
and regulatory burdens imposed on new and/or existing firms. Granted, some
governmental entry barriers can be justified as consumer protection against fraud-
ulent or incompetent business owners, and few would support a system in which
anybody could work as a doctor, surgeon, or psychologist (OECD 2007). However,
occupational licensing becomes problematic when it results in unjustified profit
opportunities for license holders rather than consumer protection. Consequently,
licensing and other overly extensive regulations may curb the rate of innovation and
hamper productive entrepreneurship (Kleiner 2006). Today, Europe has over 5,000
regulated professions involving over 50 million people, and according to the
European Commission (2015, p. 7): “many of these regulations are now dispro-
portionate and create unnecessary regulatory obstacles to the mobility of profes-
sionals, lowering productivity” (cf. Erixon and Weigel 2016).
In recent decades, governments of developed countries have deregulated product
markets with the aim of increasing market contestability and providing more
opportunities for private entrepreneurship within sectors such as telecommunica-
tions, energy production, transportation, and financial services. The scope for new
high-impact entrepreneurship has thus increased dramatically. Furthermore, welfare
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states increasingly recognize that ensuring access to health care and other social
goods and services does not necessarily require the government to produce such
goods. The Dutch example reveals that it may even be possible to eschew public
financing: In the Netherlands, health care insurance is fully privatized in the sense
that all private suppliers are forced to offer a standardized policy at a (competitive)
price, while all citizens are forced to buy such a policy (Schäfer et al. 2010).
Overall, governments are increasingly utilizing market-type mechanisms20 that
combine private provision and public financing of these services, such as out-
sourcing, vouchers and public–private partnerships. In many instances, opening
previously monopolized markets to private providers has led to impressive entre-
preneurial performances, hinting at a largely untapped productive potential in
sectors such as health care, education, and care of children and the elderly. As
examples, consider the voucher system for school choice that was introduced in
Sweden in the early 1990s and the (contemporaneous) outsourcing of health care by
many local and regional governments, which paved the way for several
high-growth firms, some of which have since become multinationals.21 Andersson
and Jordahl (2013) survey the empirical literature on the effect of outsourcing
public services and conclude that it generally reduces costs without hurting quality.
This is clearly the case for “perfectly contractible services” such as garbage col-
lection, but outsourcing also often seems to work reasonably well for services with
more difficult contracting problems, e.g., fire protection and prisons. However,
outsourcing seems to be more problematic for credence goods, that is, goods for
which buyers have a hard time determining the total cost and benefit even after
purchase and use (Emons 1997), which is the case for many social services, such as
education and medical treatments.22
Welfare services are complex and difficult to procure regardless of the source of
financing. When under the public domain, complexities arise from several addi-
tional sources: formalized procurement processes are likely to favor large actors and
curb competition; producers cannot charge extra for quality improvements; costly
excess capacity may arise; a lack of information makes rational decision making
difficult for users; evaluations and compliance control are skill- and
resource-intensive; segregating forces exist; and individual users and suppliers do
not consider how society is affected.
20OECD (2005, p. 130) defines a market-type mechanism as “encompassing all arrangements
where at least one significant characteristic of markets is present.”
21One of the most well-known examples is the health care provider Capio, which was founded in
Sweden in 1994. In 2016, Capio had 12,500 employees in four countries. There are also several
large operators in elderly care, and they are gradually becoming multinational as well. The largest
of these firms, Attendo, had roughly 15,000 employees in late 2016.
22This fact makes these goods more susceptible to fraud and manipulation. See Nooteboom (2014)
for an in-depth discussion of the many challenges involved. Thus far, there are few studies
comparing the quality of services produced by for-profit firms and by government providers,
although the evidence so far rather shows that the for-profit firms offer higher quality (Bergman
et al. 2016).
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In these sensitive areas, considerations of public interest should move firms
beyond what the law demands and towards what is really in their long-term interest.
The challenge is to create what Kay (2004) calls “embedded markets” in which
governments participate without controlling, financial incentives exist but do not
dominate, pluralist structures can evolve based on experimentation, and social
norms continue to play a key role in maintaining compliance with a system that
inspires pride in the inhabitants. Of course, this necessitates that the agents involved
“take upon themselves a wider set of responsibilities” (Kay 2004, p. 344).
Market regulations incentivizing actors in the skill structure to innovate and
experiment to the greatest possible extent are essential for a well-functioning
entrepreneurial ecosystem. Market-leading incumbents should not be allowed to
unduly exploit their dominant market positions, and all markets should be as
contestable as possible. However, drafting appropriately balanced regulations is
easier said than done; examples abound of the regulatory framework favoring a
certain interest group rather than the general public interest (Stigler 1971; Wagner
2014), giving rise to large fixed costs that effectively bar smaller actors from
entering the market (Begley et al. 2005) or falling short of its objectives in other
ways. Technological change may also turn regulations into obsolete constraints at
best and barriers to new entrants at worst, rendering adaptations to changing con-
ditions more difficult.
The fact that a certain market is formally deregulated does not guarantee con-
testability. There can still be artificial barriers created by governments and exces-
sive rules and procedures that discourage entrepreneurial entrants from challenging
incumbents,23 which hampers the process of structural change and creative
destruction. Thus, for market competition to work efficiently, it must be easy to start
a business.
3.5.2 Reform Agenda
Figure 3.5 reveals how the EU countries compare with respect to the ease of
starting a business relative to the United States and New Zealand, which is the
leading country. Countries such as Germany, Austria and Malta show considerable
room for improvement, while the western EU countries have high overall scores on
this measure. Apart from Poland and the Czech Republic, this is also the case for
the Eastern European countries.
The picture that emerges from Fig. 3.5 appears fairly bright. Part of the expla-
nation can be traced to the wave of product market deregulation that began in the
United States around 1980 and then quickly spread to other countries, rekindling
23Formal and informal institutions tend to serve the economic status quo, conserving old habits and
incumbent economic interests (Elert and Henrekson 2017). This tendency is often reinforced by
attempts by large corporations and other incumbent interests to shape government regulations in
ways that are favorable to them (Battilana et al. 2009; Lawton et al. 2013).
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innovation and entrepreneurship after a decade of stagflation and recurrent struc-
tural crises (Audretsch and Thurik 2000). Product market reform is also a prime
ingredient of the European integration effort; having similar product market regu-
lations in all EU countries is considered necessary by European policymakers to
fulfill the vision of transforming the European Union into one single market.
Nevertheless, as seen in Fig. 3.6, which presents the strictness of product and
service market regulations in the EU and the United States, countries still exhibit
large differences in the extent of their product market regulations in the European
Union despite several rounds of product market deregulations. The differences are
even larger in regard to service sector regulations (measured on the vertical axis),
and the two measures are strongly correlated; countries with highly regulated
product markets tend to have strictly regulated service markets and vice versa
(r = 0.70). Furthermore, Western European countries generally score better than
Eastern European and Mediterranean countries.
Interestingly, however, no similar correspondence can be observed between
these two indices and the measure of the ease of starting a business (Table 3.6).
This suggests that complementarities with factors besides regulations of these
markets could affect the perceived possibility of starting a business. For example,
the fact that Austria and Germany score poorly in terms of the ease of starting a
business despite their relaxed product and service market regulations could be
because a great deal more is involved in setting up a firm than just product market
regulations, including taxes, red tape, and conditions for financing.
Service sectors are particularly important for the future of the entrepreneurial
ecosystem for multiple reasons. First, they have a highly income-elastic demand
and hold possibly the greatest future potential for entrepreneurship. If onerous
















Fig. 3.5 Ease of starting a business in EU countries, the U.S., and the leading country (New
Zealand), 2015. Note The ranking of economies on the ease of starting a business is determined
based on their distance to frontier scores for starting a business. These scores are the simple
average of the distance to frontier scores for each of the component indicators. Source World
Bank, Ease of Doing Business Index 2016
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economy as a whole.24 Second, as already noted, it is becoming increasingly clear
that ensuring access to health care and other social goods and services does not
necessarily require government production of such goods, and as the Dutch case
shows, it may not even require direct public financing (although that is likely to
remain the default option in most EU countries for historical reasons). Hence,




















































Fig. 3.6 Strictness of product and service market regulations in EU countries and the U.S., 2013.
Note The scale of the index is 0–6, where a larger number means a more stringent regulation.
2013 is the latest available year. The product market regulation index is OECD’s aggregate
indicator; the service sector index is the arithmetic average of the OECD indices for professional
services, retail trade and the network sectors (transportation, energy, telecom and mail). The
indices are based on responses of national governments to the OECD Regulatory Indicator
Questionnaires. Source OECD, Product Market Regulation Database
Table 3.6 The correlations
between the ease of starting a
business and the strictness of
product (PMR) and service
market regulations (SMR)
PMR SMR Ease of starting
PMR 1.00
SMR 0.70* 1.00
Ease of starting −0.19 0.02 1.00
Note *denotes statistical significance at the 1% level
Source OECD, Product Market Regulation Database for PMR
and SMR, and World Bank, Ease of Doing Business Index 2016
24According to studies on the U.S., the income elasticity for health care and education is
approximately 1.6 (Fogel 1999).
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Perhaps most importantly, to tap the potential and handle the challenge of this
combination of public financing and private production, novel institutional
arrangements and experimentation are necessary to address the challenging fact that
consumers do not pay producers directly. Manipulation and a wasteful use of
resources are more likely to occur when the state acts as intermediary for an
anonymous and absent third party (the taxpayers) and finances transactions between
the producer and the consumer even if there is freedom of choice and competition.25
Providers typically have limited options to offer and charge for extra quality added
to what is granted through the tax-financed system. Consequently, customers will
be barred from buying their preferred qualities and quantities of services from their
preferred providers, and there will not be any signaling from spending decisions by
demanding customers.
Unless governments experiment and innovate regarding the design of the reg-
ulatory framework governing activities characterized by a mixture of private pro-
duction and public financing, the full benefits of innovation and entrepreneurial
initiatives cannot be reaped, and the ecosystem’s skill structure will remain
incomplete. Allowing private for-profit firms in these areas is also the most
important channel through which pension savings (to a considerable extent via
private equity firms) can be used to innovate and build capacity in the primarily
tax-financed social service sectors.
3.6 Bankruptcy Law and Insolvency Regulation
3.6.1 Preamble
The entrepreneurial ecosystem is experimental at its core. Failure is therefore a
signal of paramount importance to the actors in the skill structure. If the economy is
to evolve and develop, unsuccessful and unproductive entrepreneurial ventures
must close down, so that their resources can be redirected to more productive uses.
All failed projects should not be considered a waste of resources, and bankruptcies
are neither unproductive nor destructive; instead, the failure of a firm provides
valuable information to other economic agents about whether an endeavor is
profitable. Moreover, the knowledge from failed projects and ideas can often be
recycled and improved either in a restructured venture with new management or in
a different firm. Past failure can thereby be part of the foundation for future success.
The restriction or delay of this process by stringent bankruptcy regulation harms
knowledge generation and development (Holbrook et al. 2000; Gilbert et al. 2004;
Armour and Cummings 2008).
25Welfare services are supplied and consumed in so-called quasi-markets that are characterized by
a series of problems that must be addressed. Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) present a theoretical
analysis of quasi-markets.
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Psychological costs often accompany bankruptcies, and in many countries, the
public exhibits negative attitudes towards business failures (OECD 1998; Eberhart
et al. 2017), which are stigmas that may unnecessarily discourage people from
entrepreneurial activities. Some countries, such as the United States, look more
favorably upon failed business projects (Audretsch et al. 2002), and it is important
that the business culture gives failed entrepreneurs a “second chance” and allows
them to start anew. Empirical research also shows that so-called habitual or serial
entrepreneurs are more successful (Ucbasaran et al. 2008)—re-starters often possess
valuable experience and business connections that increase their probability of
success in the future. It is imperative that formal and informal institutions do not
inhibit failed entrepreneurs’ willingness to try new projects.
Meanwhile, from the perspective of the potential entrepreneur, stringent bank-
ruptcy laws are discouraging because they add to the perceived cost of starting a
business. Any new business can fail, and processes of business formation, selection,
and destruction often include a positive information and knowledge externality that
the potential entrepreneur does not consider when starting a business. Relatively
generous bankruptcy laws and insolvency regulations therefore seem reasonable
with provision for discharge clauses, the postponement of debt service and
repayment, and the possibility of restructuring.
3.6.2 Reform Agenda
An efficient handling of ailing firms calls for a well-designed and effective bank-
ruptcy law and insolvency regulation to do the following: (i) minimize the time and
costs to society in phasing out unprofitable and inefficient firms such that resources
can be reallocated to more efficient uses, and (ii) minimize the damages for other
parties involved, such as creditors, customers, suppliers, employees and the gov-
ernment. However, not all insolvent firms should be closed. A firm is insolvent
when the value of its assets is less than its debt and when it is unable to repay its
outstanding debt, but a firm may simply be experiencing temporary financial dif-
ficulties. If so, the best solution for both the firm and its creditors is normally firm
restructuring and debt reduction (a “haircut”) through negotiations with the firm’s
creditors.
On the one hand, it should not be too easy to file for bankruptcy. If writing off
debt and starting anew is too convenient a resort for failing entrepreneurs, it may
encourage exploitation and destructive entrepreneurship, harming creditors and the
rest of society (OECD 1998; Audretsch et al. 2002). On the other hand, a person
who goes bankrupt because of a failed venture should not automatically be stig-
matized and forever ostracized from future entrepreneurship.
In essence, the insolvency regulation should strive to protect inherently healthy
and promising ventures. If they are too hastily shut down, with their remaining
assets shifted out to creditors, the result may very well be excessive value
destruction. If the operation itself is healthy, it is often sufficient that the current
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owners lose all their equity, that the debt is restructured and that the consortium of
debtors find a new controlling owner after restructuring (Becker and Josephson
2016).
As shown in Fig. 3.7, there are substantial differences among the EU countries
with regard to the ease of resolving insolvency. Finland and Germany are thought to
have the best regulatory framework in this respect—even better than that of the
United States—and the rest of Western Europe also scores high except for
Luxembourg. Meanwhile, the Eastern European and Mediterranean countries rank
low with Portugal, Slovenia and Cyprus as interesting exceptions.
While laggard countries must improve their insolvency regulation in order to
become more innovative and entrepreneurial, this cannot be done in isolation.
Reforms in this direction have to be combined with a strengthening of the rule of
law and the security of property rights; otherwise, the reforms may prove ineffective
or even facilitate abuse and fraudulence. An insolvency regulation such as the one
in Finland (which is good at striking a balance between protecting and restructuring
inherently healthy firms, discouraging rent seeking, and still encouraging entre-
preneurial risk taking) is only feasible when countries also rank highly on the rule
of law, government effectiveness and the security of property rights.
Certainly, this is no easy undertaking. Portugal and Slovenia provide what may
be seen as a second-best solution in this respect. Given their apparent success, it is
probably a wise, low-risk strategy for countries with similar institutional configu-
rations to undertake reforms akin to theirs, so as not to base their reform strategy on















Fig. 3.7 Ease of resolving insolvency in EU countries and the U.S., 2015. Note The ranking of
economies on the ease of resolving insolvency is determined based on their distance to frontier
scores for resolving insolvency. These scores are the simple average of the distance to frontier
scores for the recovery rate and the strength of insolvency framework index. Finland is also the
most highly ranked country in the world. Source World Bank, Doing Business 2016
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3.7 R&D, Commercialization and Knowledge Spillovers
3.7.1 Preamble
The successful exploitation of research and inventions combined with the transfer
and spillover of the related knowledge stimulates growth and prosperity in a
modern economy (e.g., Acs et al. 2009 and Baumol 2010). Entrepreneurs play an
important role in this respect in both new and established ventures, by virtue of their
ability to recognize unexploited opportunities in the market and to spread inno-
vations by imitation and incremental improvements of existing technologies
(Baumol 2002). An important objective of entrepreneurship policy must be to
promote this process of production and commercialization of knowledge.
In the early phase of industrialization in the West, leading innovators were
mostly people with little formal education whose innovations emanated from
practical experience in workshops and production plants. This gradually changed
when specialized engineering schools were formed in the late 19th century both in
Europe and the United States, followed by the formation of R&D departments in
the large engineering firms (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986, Chap. 8; Mowery and
Rosenberg 1998). However, even today, the common idea that more R&D spending
is the tool that will promote innovation reveals an overly mechanical view of how
the entrepreneurial ecosystem works. New knowledge and inventions are only the
first step in an innovation and commercialization process. For increased R&D to
translate into economic growth, entrepreneurs must exploit the inventions by
introducing new methods of production or new products in the marketplace (Bhidé
2008; Michelacci 2003).
Neither Bill Gates nor Henry Ford invented the technologies used in their
ventures, but in their role as entrepreneurs, they were needed to successfully exploit
inventions that someone else had created. The EOE perspective illustrates this
forcefully through its emphasis on the need for a number of different actors and
competencies to fully realize the benefits of innovation. Limiting the focus to
inventions and R&D misses the bulk of the story, and although high R&D spending
can be a necessary component of a successful economy, it is far from sufficient.
Increased R&D will not automatically bring forth entrepreneurs—perhaps it is even
the other way around; in an economic system that rewards productive
entrepreneurship, a great deal of R&D is undertaken because the results flowing
from R&D are demanded (Holcombe 2007).
The knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship offers a complimentary
view (Acs et al. 2009; Braunerhjelm et al. 2010), which is important for several
reasons. First, and in the vein of Schumpeter (1934), it distinguishes between
knowledge in general and economic knowledge (i.e., knowledge that is economi-
cally exploitable) and conjectures that more knowledge (more R&D) does not
automatically translate into more economic knowledge. Second, this theory rejects
the assumption that (economic) knowledge automatically spills over and induces
growth. Rather, the theory highlights the importance of the entrepreneur in enabling
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these crucial transformations. The entrepreneur is the actor who transforms
knowledge into economic knowledge through the commercialization of inventions,
and the one who brings about knowledge spillovers throughout the economy.
Knowledge is often tacit, sticky and uncertain, making it costly and difficult to
transmit and evaluate (Arrow 1962). As the innovative process is shrouded in
uncertainty, the expected value and variance of an innovation will differ across
individuals—a discrepancy that creates high profit opportunities for entrepreneurial
firms or spinoffs in instances when incumbent firms do not recognize or realize a
profit opportunity.
Furthermore, innovation and entrepreneurship are largely localized phenomena,
and innovation capabilities originate from the interplay between generic knowledge
and learning processes that are embedded in regional knowledge and market
environments (Zucker et al. 1998). A critical mass seems to be required for a
dynamic innovation environment to emerge since there are many benefits for firms
located close to other firms in dense, knowledge-intensive areas (Feldman 1994;
Feldman and Audretsch 1999; Paci and Usai 1999; Ejermo 2009; Delgado et al.
2014).
Such dense environments are characterized by distinct wage and productivity
premiums—strong centripetal forces that attract both individuals and firms (Puga
2010). Glaeser and Mare (2001), for example, report a wage premium in the U.S. of
33% between the largest metropolitan areas and non-urban locations. Such effects
are also reported for European countries (Di Addario and Patacchini 2008;
Andersson et al. 2014; D’Costa and Overman 2014). The evidence also suggests
that the existence of strong clusters in a region enhances growth opportunities in
other industries and clusters (Delgado et al. 2014).
3.7.2 Reform Agenda
Table 3.7 reveals that expenditure on R&D currently constitutes a sizable share of
GDP in rich countries. In the EU, the total R&D spending ranges from roughly 3%
of GDP in the Nordic countries, Germany and Austria (slightly higher than the U.S.
level) to below 1% in most Eastern European and Mediterranean countries (column
1). Importantly, among top spenders, as much as 70% of total R&D spending is
made by firms; the rest is spent by the government, primarily through the funding of
academic research (columns 2 and 3). Furthermore, the business sector share of
R&D is substantially lower in countries that have a low overall spending on R&D
with the government share normally exceeding 50%. The ranking of countries is
thus highly similar when comparing R&D spending by business enterprises.
The variation across Europe is further accentuated when considering that the
number of researchers engaged in R&D per million inhabitants is almost ten times
higher in Denmark at the top compared to Cyprus at the bottom (column 4).
Nevertheless, as argued above, R&D spending and the number of researchers per
capita are input measures. Output from the R&D sector is economically valuable
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Table 3.7 Total gross expenditure on R&D and business R&D spending (BERD) as a share of
GDP (2014), number of researchers per million population (2014), number of patent families






















Finland 3.17 2.15 0.32 6,986 8.38 3.3
Sweden 3.16 2.12 0.33 6,868 7.74 6.6
Denmark 3.08 1.98 0.36 7,198 4.27 6.1
Austria 3.00b 2.11b 0.30 4,815 4.28 12.8
Germany 2.84 1.93 0.32 4,460 5.87 4.0
USA 2.73a 1.92a 0.30 4,019c 2.75 13.5c
Belgium 2.46 1.76 0.70 4,176 2.12 17.0c
Slovenia 2.39 1.85 0.23 4,145 1.69 18.4
France 2.26 1.46 0.35 4,201 3.52 25.3
Czech Rep. 2.00 1.12 0.44 3,418 0.68 16.1
Netherlands 1.97 1.11 0.44 4,478 3.43 15.3
UK 1.70 1.10 0.35 4,252 2.22 14.5
Ireland 1.52 1.11 0.27 3,732 1.69 20.7c
Estonia 1.43 0.62 0.57 3,271 0.47 12.9
Hungary 1.37 0.98 0.28 2,651 0.55 32.7
Italy 1.29 0.72 0.57 2,007 1.68 6.9
Portugal 1.29 0.59 0.54 3,700 0.39 22.0
Luxembourg 1.26 0.66 0.60 4,577 6.24
Spain 1.22 0.64 0.48 2,641 0.69 15.6c
Lithuania 1.01 0.30 0.70 2,962 0.37
Poland 0.94 0.44 0.50 2,037 0.48 9.1
Slovakia 0.89 0.33 0.63 2,718 0.30 6.1
Malta 0.85 0.51 0.40 2,133 2.48
Greece 0.83 0.28 0.66 2,699 0.35 21.4
Croatia 0.79 0.38 0.52 1,437 0.20
Bulgaria 0.78 0.51 0.35 1,818 0.29
Latvia 0.69 0.25 0.64 1,884 0.27
Cyprus 0.47 0.08 0.83 750 0.73
Romania 0.38 0.16 0.58 922 0.11
Note a2013; b2015; c2012
Source R&D expenditure: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, UIS online database (2007–15).
Researchers: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, UIS online database (2007–14). Patents: World
Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Statistics Database; International Monetary Fund, World
Economic Outlook Database, October 2015 (PPP$ GDP) (2007–12). Government support: OECD
Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2015
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knowledge and innovations. One such measure consists of the number of patents
per capita (column 5). Indeed, we can see a strong cross-country correlation
between R&D spending and the rate of patenting.26
Increased R&D spending can thus be associated with an increased production of
economically valuable knowledge, as measured by the rate of patenting. However,
this does not imply that a policy of increased government R&D spending will
automatically result in more economically valuable knowledge. First, patents are
not the only way of measuring new economic knowledge; when Da Rin et al.
(2006) examined 14 European countries in a panel between 1988 and 2001, they
did not find any positive relationship between public R&D spending and the rate of
innovation, which they defined as the share of high-tech and early-stage venture
capital investments. Furthermore, as shown in the last column of Table 3.7, the
share of R&D in the business sector that is directly or indirectly funded by the
government is lowest in countries with the highest R&D spending by business
enterprises (see Appendix Table A.2 for a more detailed overview).
In line with our previous discussion, this suggests that higher spending on R&D
does not automatically produce more innovations or more entrepreneurial activity.
Instead, if a well-functioning entrepreneurial ecosystem is not already in place, the
full potential from increased R&D cannot be reaped. Therefore, quantitative R&D
goals risk becoming a waste of resources, as focus and resources are directed
towards factors that would have found a better use elsewhere in the economy.
Instead, in an economic system encouraging productive entrepreneurship, a great
deal of R&D is undertaken because the results from R&D are demanded. Here,
entrepreneurs and demanding customers in the ecology’s skill structure serve as
particularly crucial sources of information regarding consumer needs and prefer-
ences (von Hippel et al. 2011).
Policymakers cannot hope to offset deficiencies in other policy areas by directly
favoring R&D. In line with the argument in Sect. 2.2, the main role of the gov-
ernment should be to enable and facilitate rather than to subsidize certain industries
or firms. Most importantly, governments should adhere to the late Steven Klepper’s
(2016) persuasive findings that strong and highly dynamic industry clusters could
emerge anywhere and gain momentum through entrepreneurial spinoffs from the
leading firms. The implication is clear: it should be easy to start a business, and
incentives for individuals to behave entrepreneurially and grow the new businesses
should be strong. However, it is still important to avoid spoiling the strong tradition
in many European countries of harboring innovations, even of a radical kind, inside
large firms through intrapreneurship (Stam and Stenkula 2017).
Research also reveals that geographic proximity facilitates knowledge spillover
and knowledge transfer, suggesting a potential role for the government in promoting
networks, clusters and urbanization. Appendix Table A.3 shows the prevalence of
clusters in European economies and the United States, revealing that clusters are
26Of course, the number of patents is not a perfect measure of innovation either (Boldrin and
Levine 2013).
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considerably more common inWestern European countries than in Eastern European
and Mediterranean countries. If cluster policy enables more transfer of knowledge
between businesses and organizations, entrepreneurship may be facilitated as a result
(Moretti 2012; Moretti and Thulin 2013). For example, well-functioning housing
markets, where the prices reflect scarcity and preferences, are necessary conditions for
continued growth in dense areas (Glaeser 2008, 2011), as is an adequate infrastructure
that allows for smooth transportation and commuting.
However, this form of support should not be directed to specific firms; instead,
firms must self-select and not be “picked”. Policymakers would do well to
remember that cluster formation is a long-term process that cannot be accelerated
by means of a quick policy fix. By contrast, when different policies complement
and reinforce one another, region-specific connections and institutions evolve and
adapt over time in a complex interaction that often becomes a key component of a
region’s competitive advantage (Gertler 2004; Wolfe and Gertler 2006).
3.8 Incentives for Human Capital Investment
3.8.1 Preamble
Economic growth and prosperity depend to a large extent on human capital—
economically valuable knowledge tied to and inseparable from the individual (see,
e.g., Barro 2001). Human capital can be acquired in many ways, such as through
formal schooling, formal and informal on-the-job training, labor market programs
and retraining, and informal experience and the cultivation of personal interest.
There is little doubt that the incentives to invest in human capital are important for
growth, a view strongly supported by the economic growth literature (Lucas 1988;
Mankiw et al. 1992).
In particular, human capital of a mathematical and natural science orientation is
deemed to be important for science-based entrepreneurship (Shavinina 2013).
Successful entrepreneurial ventures are often highly dependent on academically
trained and motivated individuals. People who engage in knowledge-based
entrepreneurship can have many different backgrounds, such as university facul-
ties, other firms, and the general pool of individuals with a graduate or an under-
graduate degree.
According to human capital theory (Schultz 1960; Becker 1964), the decision to
acquire and use human capital can be analyzed as an individual investment decision
governed by the rate of return on human capital, often measured as the relative
increase in the individual’s (discounted lifetime increase in) wage that can be
attributed to an additional year of schooling. However, such an educational pre-
mium before tax is an imperfect measure of the true rate of return on education,
which is also determined by factors such as the progressivity of the tax system, the
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availability of scholarships and subsidized loans,27 tuition fees, the age at the time
of graduation, and the continually changing risk of becoming unemployed.
Hence, government policy can influence the incentives and opportunities for
individuals to acquire human capital in numerous ways. The most obvious measure
is by directly allocating public funds to the educational system. Even more potent is
the way policy incentivizes agents in the educational system itself, and how such
activities and policies can complement or act as a substitute for the training pro-
vided by employers. In addition, as discussed in the previous sections, income
taxes, wage differentials, and a well-designed social insurance system are important
components in making it beneficial to acquire productive knowledge that is sub-
sequently used intensively. Overall, it may be said that this incentivization requires
substantial knowledge of the strategic choices individuals make over the course of
their many years of human capital formation.
The first strategic choice occurs in high school when the individual decides
whether to enter the labor market or to proceed to a university. If the individual
enrolls in a university, he or she faces a choice between science- and
technology-based disciplines (or STEM fields—science, technology, engineering,
and math) and other areas. At graduation, the natural science graduates can again
choose between employment and graduate studies with the objective of obtaining a
Ph.D., but the quality of the educational system at the primary and secondary levels
largely determines how much can be demanded from students at the tertiary level. If
the quality of their previous education has been deficient, fewer students will be
willing or able to choose more analytically demanding lines of study. Finally, after
receiving a Ph.D., the individual faces yet another choice between a university
career and other employment.
Obviously, all links must function efficiently for knowledge-based entrepreneur-
ship to flourish. There must be sufficient incentives (i) to invest in human capital at the
university level, (ii) to become involved in knowledge-based entrepreneurial ven-
tures, and (iii) to adjust the university subject areas to bring them into line with
business sector demand and to facilitate the transfer of knowledge from academia to
the entrepreneurial sector. This third factor can be expected to have complex reper-
cussions for the individual’s decisions at every stage. The incentives in the university
system will directly influence the propensity of faculty members to become involved
in entrepreneurial ventures while also affecting the educational choices of students.
27The effect of subsidized loans and scholarships on human capital investment is particularly
difficult to assess. It is trivially true that, ceteris paribus, the rate of return for attending a university
increases (Edin and Holmlund 1995). However, loan subsidies and scholarships boost the rate of
return by giving rise to income during studies as opposed to educational premiums that give rise to
(higher) income after completion of the studies. Thus, loan subsidies and scholarships that are not
correlated with the rate of return for the training are likely to lower the incentives to choose the
type of education that provides the most human capital investment as measured by the rate of
return in terms of relative wages. This effect is reinforced if there is no tuition.
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If the rate of return on schooling is low, individuals can partly adjust by basing
their educational choice more on what they enjoy to study than on what might be
beneficial to them in their subsequent careers, seeing education more as a con-
sumption good and less as an investment in human capital. This might include a
lower willingness to opt for demanding lines of study that deprive students of
leisure time or prevent them from working part-time. Hence, human capital
investment may be endogenous in the sense that individuals adjust their actual
investment in human capital (as opposed to the number of years of schooling) to the
institutionally given rate of return.
Empirical research reveals a positive correlation between formal education and
informal human capital investment in the form of on-the-job training (Mincer 1984;
Heckman 2000). At the same time, strong incentives for such training may partially
substitute for weak incentives for formal education, and the wage structure may also
encourage intense and efficient use of the individual’s human capital.
In this respect, it is important to note that successful entrepreneurs in the United
States tend to have advanced degrees.28 Strong educational credentials are also
common among European billionaire entrepreneurs. This is likely due to the causal
effect of human capital and access to new ideas and to the fact that unusually
talented individuals are selected into elite universities. Potential entrepreneurs face
several educational and career choices, especially early in life. If the incentives to
seek advanced education are distorted, individuals could make choices that make
them less likely to acquire the type of knowledge that is valuable to entrepreneurial
firms.
Moreover, entrepreneurial firms must be able to recruit highly competent people.
The entrepreneurial sector in Silicon Valley has evolved in close cooperation with
academic research at adjacent Stanford University. Europe’s lack of elite univer-
sities (outside of the United Kingdom) compared to the United States is likely to be
a disadvantage for the European Union’s ability to develop Schumpeterian
entrepreneurship.29
In contrast to the university systems in most European countries, the American
university system is decentralized and intensely competitive. American universities
retain a high degree of autonomy; thus, they can pursue opportunities to solve their
own problems and to build on their own unique strengths and aspirations.
Competition occurs along several dimensions: (i) competition among universities
for students and among professors for the best students at the graduate level;
28Many so-called super-entrepreneurs, i.e., entrepreneurs who built billion dollar fortunes by
starting and growing their own companies, have acquired extensive human capital. In the U.S., one
third of super-entrepreneurs have a degree from an elite university such as Harvard, Stanford or the
University of Chicago, compared to less than 1% of the total labor force (Henrekson and Sanandaji
2014).
29Except for UK universities, only six of the 50 highest ranked universities in the world come from
EU member countries according to The Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2015–
2016 (https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2016/world-ranking#!/
page/0/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats).
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(ii) competition among universities for the best professors in a cultural and eco-
nomic context in which mobility is high; and (iii) competition among professors for
research support, giving them time away from teaching and access to comple-
mentary resources. That said, the European university systems do have some
advantages relative to the U.S. system, especially because they have no or low
tuition fees, which makes the best universities affordable regardless of one’s social
background. The challenge for Europe is to retain its openness while increasing the
quality of its universities.
3.8.2 Reform Agenda
The first column of Table 3.8 reveals surprisingly large differences in educational
expenditures as a share of GDP across EU countries, where spending can differ by
as much as a factor of three. The three Nordic countries are at the top, while the
bottom is dominated by Eastern European countries and Italy. Yet high spending is
not everything. The important thing to ask is, first, to what extent does high
spending translate into more knowledge among students? Secondly, to what extent
is this knowledge economic, i.e., useful in production?
Arguably, the best source available for answering these questions comes from
OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). The most
comprehensive study to date finds a strong and statistically robust relationship
between national economic performance and the level of knowledge as measured in
internationally comparable tests, such as PISA and TIMSS (Hanushek and
Woessman (2015).30 PISA test results in mathematics, science and reading for the
year 2012 are presented in columns 2–4 in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8 makes clear that high educational spending can be associated with top
results (Finland) as well as weak results (Sweden). Conversely, pupils in Poland
and Estonia have excellent results despite relatively low educational spending,
while Romania and Bulgaria spend little and do poorly. (In all three areas, Chinese
pupils are outstanding.) In the United States, allegedly the most innovative and
entrepreneurial of all countries, government spending on education is intermediate,
but complementary private spending is substantial (2% of GDP compared to an EU
average of 0.3% of GDP; see OECD 2015b, p. 207). Thus, despite high total
spending, U.S. pupils perform below average in all three areas and poorly in
mathematics.
30The PISA survey was created by the OECD as a response to member countries’ demand for a
reliable metric of pupils’ knowledge and skills. Every three years, nationally representative
samples of 15-year old pupils take a test in mathematical, reading and scientific literacy. The
number of participants has increased over time; in the 2012 survey, 65 countries and economies
were represented (OECD 2013). TIMSS stands for Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study and is a test given every four years since 1995 in mathematics and science to 11-
and 15-year-olds (Mullis et al. 2012a, b).
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Hence, it appears that even though educational expenditure can be potentially
beneficial for the generation of economic knowledge, there is a great risk that the
money is spent inefficiently. However, poorly performing countries clearly have
plenty of room to learn how to organize “production” in the education sector more
efficiently.
In this respect, it is notable that tertiary enrollment has exploded in recent
decades, which is evident from the first column of Table 3.9. The enrolment rate is
very high in many of the poorest EU countries, notably Greece, Bulgaria and the
Baltic countries. However, high enrolment rates per se are no guarantee that uni-
versity studies have a high social rate of return. The resources per student vary
enormously across fields, countries and schools (van der Ploeg and Veugelers
2008), but the humanities and social sciences are generally far less costly than the
STEM fields, and there is an obvious temptation for policymakers to expand
inexpensive programs in order to boost university enrolment, since this is a rela-
tively inexpensive way of giving the impression of investing a lot in human capital.
Such actions would be illusory, and the damage would be exacerbated if such
measures crowd out existing non-academic post-secondary education and voca-
tional training at the upper secondary level. Traditionally, such education has been
important in central European countries (see Appendix Fig. A.3).
A high enrolment rate may also conceal the fact that many of those who enroll
never manage to complete their studies, which, as mentioned, depends on whether
previous education levels have equipped them with the ability and willingness to do
so. In Slovenia and Sweden, a mere 47 and 53%, respectively, have completed their
Bachelor’s program three years after scheduled graduation. The corresponding
figures in the United Kingdom and the United States are 84 and 78%, respectively
(see the rightmost column of Table 3.10). A deficient quality at lower levels of
education may also cause fewer students to choose more analytically demanding
disciplines (see the second column of Table 3.9).
As mentioned, the decision to acquire and use economically valuable human
capital is ultimately an individual investment decision governed to a considerable
extent by the rate of return on human capital (Schultz 1960; Becker 1964).
Table 3.10 presents two arguably imperfect measures of this rate of return. The first
column demonstrates that the rate of return on schooling varies greatly across
countries from the United States, Germany and Poland at the top to Denmark, Italy
and Sweden at the bottom. Comparing the overall rate of return with the return on
analytical/numerical ability in the second column underscores the vital importance
of this type of knowledge.
These findings merit an additional discussion, notably related to the differences
in the university systems in Europe compared to the United States, the features of
which were briefly discussed in Sect. 3.8.1. The U.S. university system seems more
responsive to the economic needs of society than the university systems in most
European countries. High tuition fees mean that students expect a high degree of
relevance from the offered curricula. Likewise, professors who are dependent on
research grants are more likely to adjust their research to fields that have high
economic value (Rosenberg 2000). Decentralization and competition in the
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American system also result in greater wage dispersion with salaries being more
likely to reflect the economic relevance of a field and the professor’s achievements
in research and teaching. Entirely new fields and major breakthroughs in established
fields have been rapidly introduced to the curricula of leading U.S. universities over
the years.
Table 3.9 Tertiary enrolment and graduates in science and engineering in EU countries and the
U.S., 2013






























Note a2012; b2014. The ratio of total tertiary enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the
age group that officially corresponds to the tertiary level of education. Tertiary education, whether
or not aiming at an advanced research qualification, normally requires, as a minimum condition of
admission, the successful completion of education at the secondary level. Graduates in science and
engineering is defined as the share of all tertiary graduates in science, manufacturing, engineering,
and construction over all tertiary graduates (n/a Germany)
Source UNESCO Institute for Statistics, UIS online database (2007–14)
3.8 Incentives for Human Capital Investment 69
The challenge for Europe is to remain accessible to everyone regardless of social
background while increasing the quality of its universities to establish more
world-class universities in the EU (outside of the United Kingdom). To meet this
challenge, it must first be recognized that most European university systems are
highly centralized; universities tend to be government owned, and the entry of
private universities is disallowed or highly restricted (Jongbloed 2010). The gov-
ernment typically grants charters to universities and determines the rules of
admission and the university’s size (through budgetary allocations) as well as the
size of specific fields of study. Such control makes individual institutions less
flexible, for example when it comes to varying remuneration based on an individual
professor’s research and teaching performances or according to the economic value
of the professor’s field. A high degree of centralization also makes it more difficult
for individual universities to adjust the allocation of research budgets across fields
in response to changing demands outside of academia.








USA 11.1 USA 27.9 78
Poland 10.1 Ireland 24.1 94
Germany 9.5 Germany 23.5 n/a
Slovakia 9.5 Spain 22.8 n/a
Cyprus 8.9 UK 22.5 84
UK 8.5 Poland 19.1 n/a
Ireland 8.5 Netherlands 18.3 66
Netherlands 8.2 Austria 17.9 78
Spain 7.9 Slovakia 17.9 n/a
Austria 7.7 Estonia 17.9 51
Estonia 7.4 France 17.4 70
Finland 6.8 Belgium 14.9 n/a
Belgium 6.2 Finland 14.2 n/a
Czech Rep. 5.9 Cyprus 13.8 n/a
France 5.5 Denmark 13.7 81
Denmark 5.5 Italy 13.2 n/a
Italy 5.3 Czech Rep. 12.4 60
Sweden 4.2 Sweden 12.1 53
Note The educational premium is defined as the relative increase in the wage that can be attributed
to an additional year of schooling. The return on analytical/numerical ability is defined as the
relative increase in the wage that results from a one standard deviation increase in a person’s
PIAAC score for numeracy. All EU countries in the Hanushek et al. study are included in the table.
The completion rate is defined as the share of student’s who entered a Bachelor’s Program that
have graduated six years later (2014)
Source Hanushek et al. (2015) and OECD (2016, p. 175)
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While it would be unrealistic to believe that European countries could mimic the
U.S. university system, certain steps could be taken to level the playing field.
Notably, the link between universities and external stakeholders could be
strengthened (see Appendix Table A.4). Google and Netscape provide two inter-
esting examples of innovations originating from university campuses (in both cases
from a private university). Learning from such examples would facilitate the
stimulation of academic entrepreneurship and accelerate the commercialization of
university-developed innovations of great potential value (Goldfarb and Henrekson
2003; Kauffman Foundation 2007). For this to be successful, university faculty
must encourage and stimulate entrepreneurial initiatives while incentives for uni-
versity spinoffs remain strong. Some universities have a Technology Transfer Office
(TTO), an in-house organization specializing in assisting academic entrepreneurs in
commercializing their inventions. However, a TTO could also hinder the com-
mercialization of useful technologies by making the process too bureaucratic and
focusing on its own narrowly defined proprietary interests and key performance
indicators (Baumol et al. 2007; Kauffman Foundation 2008). Given the U.S. evi-
dence, we are hesitant to advocate this route.
In the Horizon 2020 initiative, the EU states:
By coupling research and innovation, Horizon 2020 is helping to achieve this with its
emphasis on excellent science, industrial leadership and tackling societal challenges. The
goal is to ensure Europe produces world-class science, removes barriers to innovation and
makes it easier for the public and private sectors to work together in delivering
innovation.31
If the EU is serious about achieving this goal, universities and other public
institutions of learning need to become more entrepreneurial, flexible and adaptive
towards market demand. Again, the challenge is to find the right balance between
quality and accessibility and to be sensitive to the more egalitarian educational
tradition in Europe while making the system of higher learning more dynamic and
responsive to the needs of the entrepreneurial ecosystem.
3.9 Informal Institutions
3.9.1 Preamble
Informal institutions are typically described as the customs, traditions, and norms
that permeate society (Williamson 1998, 2000), and they are arguably of great
relevance to entrepreneurship and innovation. This is partly because informal
institutions affect the workings of formal institutions; they can function as substi-
tutes for formal institutions in reducing transaction costs (Arrow 1972; Glaeser
et al. 2002), and the law derives much of its value from the respect that it enjoys by
31https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/what-horizon-2020.
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being consistent with these informal institutions (Kasper et al. 2012; cf. Becker and
Murphy 2000). The flipside of the coin is that reforms of formal institutions may
prove counterproductive if undertaking them destroys the existing benefits of
informal institutions (Berkowitz et al. 2003; Lundström and Stevenson 2005; Dixit
2009; Ebner 2009).
Informal institutions are also important to entrepreneurship in their own right.
McCloskey (2016) argues that the norms regarding honorable and appropriate
behavior have been important historically for entrepreneurship and economic
development; when people promote and honor entrepreneurs and their virtues, the
floodgates of economic development will open (cf. Goldstone 1987; Mokyr 1992).
Other cultural factors, such as individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoid-
ance, masculinity and self-expressive values, have also been revealed as drivers of
innovation and entrepreneurship (Shane 2003; Hechavarria and Reynolds 2009;
Taylor and Wilson 2012).
Furthermore, trust, already identified as a generally important determinant for
enabling economic coordination, efficiency and growth (Knack and Keefer 1997;
Zak and Knack 2001; Karlan 2005; Sabatini 2008; Pugno and Verme 2012), has
become a variable of increasing interest for entrepreneurship scholars (Welter and
Smallbone 2006; Welter 2012). High-trust environments are said to foster market
entry, enterprise growth and productive entrepreneurship (Fukuyama 1996; cf.
Welter and Smallbone 2006), and individual trust is believed to be of fundamental
importance for supporting network relations (Jack et al. 2004; Kim and Aldrich
2005; Anderson et al. 2007). As a lubricant without which network activity could
not be possible (Anderson and Jack 2002), trust is therefore immediately relevant
for a better functioning entrepreneurial ecosystem of the kind envisioned in Chap. 2
with the potential to affect all nodes in the skill structure.
In summary, informal institutions affect the workings of formal institutions, but
they are also important for the fostering of entrepreneurship in their own right. The
social legitimacy of entrepreneurs is especially important in this respect.
3.9.2 Reform Agenda
Above, we identified trust as a fundamental informal institution for economic
efficiency as well as entrepreneurship. In fact, it might arguably take precedence
over other cultural factors, such as attitudes towards entrepreneurship, competition
or individualism.32 The point can perhaps best be illustrated by plotting the EU
countries with respect to their level of trust and their attitude towards competition,
which is done in Fig. 3.8.
32As shown in Stam and Stenkula (2017), trust may be an important explanation for the high level
of intrapreneurship in Sweden and the other Nordic countries.
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In terms of views towards competition, countries from Eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean are among those that view it most favorably (Malta, Bulgaria,
Romania and Slovakia) and least favorably (Spain and Cyprus). This suggests that
the attitude towards competition is a poor determinant of innovation and
entrepreneurship in and of itself. Meanwhile, whereas the Mediterranean countries
and parts of Eastern Europe score low on trust, the Nordic countries and the
Netherlands score exceptionally high. Of these high-trust countries, Sweden stands
out as having the most positive attitude towards competition. High-trust countries
are also more individualistic and less worried about uncertainty. With a generally
high-trusting pattern, Western European countries exhibit high degrees of indi-
vidualism and are better at dealing with (or worry less about) uncertainty, whereas
Eastern European and Mediterranean countries exhibit more collectivism and worry
more about uncertainty. These patterns can be seen in Figs. A.4–A.6 in the
Appendix.
One way of interpreting these correlations is that promoting competition in a
low-trust environment is likely to prove futile or even detrimental. Though it may
lead to entrepreneurship, it is likely to be of an unproductive or even destructive
nature (cf. Baumol 1990). By contrast, a more positive view of competition is likely











































Attitude towards competition (scale 0–10 with 1 meaning very positive)
Fig. 3.8 Trust and attitudes toward competition in EU countries. Note The figure is based on V62
(share of people who claim that most people can be trusted), and V196 (mean on a scale from 1–10
with 1 meaning “Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas”,
and 10 meaning “Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people.”) Source European
Value Survey 2008
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Another question is whether trust can be promoted. A number of studies claim
that trust can be improved by political means. Notably, the positive cross-country
correlation between welfare-state size and trust is taken as evidence that certain
types of welfare policies can produce trust and social capital (Barr 2004; Kumlin
and Rothstein 2005; Uslaner and Rothstein 2005) or that more free market insti-
tutions can increase trust levels (Berggren and Jordahl 2006). Others argue that
overall, causality should be reversed with historically high-trust populations being
more likely and able to create and sustain large, universal welfare states of the
Nordic type (Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011), while trust and trustworthiness can also
substitute for government controls and regulations (Aghion et al. 2010). From this
perspective, the development of a trust culture is characterized by path depen-
dencies and spirals fueled by unique historical circumstances (Humphrey and
Schmitz 1998; Nooteboom 2002), suggesting that the evolution of a trust culture
can take generations (Williamson 2000). In sum, this suggests that it is unlikely that
policy in the short- or medium-run can improve trust and other norms relevant to
entrepreneurship.
Evidently, the challenge of changing informal institutions in Eastern Europe is
the most urgent but also the most difficult. The informal institutions in these
countries evolved in the Soviet-dominated system, which made low trust a neces-
sity for the people. With the fall of the Eastern bloc, a rapid shift occurred towards a
capitalist system, the functioning of which would have benefitted greatly from
higher trust and a greater tolerance towards uncertainty. These cultural changes
have yet to materialize. Hence, while increased trust levels would evidently
improve the conditions for innovation and entrepreneurship, policy is unlikely to be
able to induce that change.
3.10 Summary and Conclusions: Institutions Nurturing
a More Entrepreneurial Europe
The discussion in the previous sections of this chapter is summarized in Table 3.11,
assigning to each policy area the general prescription regarding the characteristics
required for a regime fostering entrepreneurship and innovation.
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Chapter 4
Summary and Conclusions
Abstract To promote innovation and economic growth in the European Union, we
propose a reform strategy with respect to the aforementioned nine areas, which we
consider to be the most pertinent institutions and policies in order to foster a
productive entrepreneurial economy. Overall, the proposed institutional changes
move in a liberalizing direction, but we acknowledge that one-size-fits-all policy
reforms aimed at freer markets will not necessarily be successful. Instead, a suc-
cessful reform strategy must consider country differences that affect the viability of
reform. Nevertheless, policymakers should not lose sight of the long-term goal of
institutional liberalization to promote entrepreneurship, innovation and growth.
Hopefully, this work inspires both confidence and humility regarding Europe’s
innovation future.
Keywords Entrepreneurship  European Union  Innovation  Institutions  Policy
reform  Regulation  Self-employment
The purpose of this study has been to propose an institutional reform strategy to
enhance innovation and entrepreneurial activity in Europe. In doing so, we
acknowledged the existence of several types of capitalism among the EU member
countries. These types have evolved into highly complex entities that are held
together by a number of complementary institutions. None of these models con-
sistently exhibits superior performance in terms of social welfare, making it difficult
to determine which model the European Union as a whole should strive to converge
towards.
The observation that the European Union overall suffers from a lack of inno-
vation motivates the analysis in this study. We identify entrepreneurship and
innovation as the relevant aspects that policy reforms should strive to improve.
Entrepreneurship and innovation are crucial for the growth of the polities in which
they occur and for their effect on growth on a global scale. An innovation is the
translation of an idea or an invention into an economically valuable good or service,
and if it can cross borders the innovation can be implemented to the benefit of the
inhabitants of countries far different from the one in which it originated.
© The Author(s) 2017
N. Elert et al., Institutional Reform for Innovation and Entrepreneurship,
SpringerBriefs in Economics, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55092-3_4
87
It is increasingly understood that innovation is important for the European Union
and its member states, as evidenced by the broad consensus on the political goal
that the Union become more innovative and entrepreneurial. The most appropriate
strategy to achieve this goal is a complicated issue. Should all member countries
adopt reform packages that make them more alike, further increasing the political
and economic convergence that has been ushered in by years of negotiation and
collaboration? Or should those member states that can reasonably be classified as
belonging to the same variety of capitalism espouse a reform strategy specifically
designed for that variety?
Our answer falls somewhere between these extremes. While we identify what we
believe would be the most beneficial institutional framework for innovation and
entrepreneurship, we also acknowledge that this agenda is easy to identify only at a
rather high level of theoretical abstraction (Rodrik 2007), to say nothing of how
difficult it may be for member states to achieve it in practice. In fact, given the many
institutional complementarities in the framework conditions of member states, the
idea of all of them embarking on an immediate and straightforward journey towards
best-practice institutions is naïve to say the least; at worst, it may even be detri-
mental to achieving the very institutional reforms we advocate (Pistor 2002; Dixit
2009). Rather, a reform strategy must be tailored to each country’s specific needs.
Overall, the proposed institutional changes are slanted in a liberalizing direction,
but this does not mean that one-size-fits-all policy reforms towards freer markets are
likely to be successful, at least not immediately. Below, we identify several points
to which such a strategy should adhere.
First, a European reform agenda, even though its eyes should be set on liber-
alization, needs sophistication. While the identification of best-practice institutions
is a sine qua non for the agenda to be successful, it must be accompanied by a
recognition that first-order economic principles—the protection of property, con-
tract enforcement, market competition, etc.—do not map onto unique policy
packages. Hence, no unique correspondence exists between functionally good
institutions and the form that such institutions take. Desirable economic ends can be
achieved through a number of different institutional bundles. What is most
appropriate is highly context-dependent; at worst, a thoughtless introduction of
first-class legal institutions can backfire if instead of taking hold they undermine
existing domestic institutions (Rodrik 2008). It falls on reformers to creatively
package the principles into institutional designs that are sensitive to local con-
straints and take advantage of local opportunities.
Second, a reform agenda must be appropriately concrete. Most historical and
econometric studies about institutions and growth (e.g., North and Thomas 1973;
Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001) tend to remain at a high level of
generality and do not provide much policy guidance (Besley and Burgess 2003;
Rodrik 2008). In this study, we have attempted to go beyond abstract reasoning and
drilled down to the specific effects of particular measures. Much more work is
required in this respect, but hopefully, we have proceeded somewhat further down
the ladder of concreteness.
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Third, the reform agenda must prioritize, and the EOE and VoC perspectives are
valuable for understanding how. The EOE perspective helps us identify which
institutions matter the most for the key actors in the entrepreneurial ecosystem,
whereas the VoC perspective elucidates how countries group with respect to these
institutions and hints at the institutional complementarities that characterize a
particular cluster of countries. Much more work is required here, an important part
of which is to identify and remove so-called institutional bottlenecks (Acs et al.
2014). Doing so will make it possible to more directly identify the problems that
ought to be the top priority within a cluster. Furthermore, countries in a cluster can
be more or less successful, and their relative rank within the cluster has important
informational and practical value when the reform process is undertaken. Rather
than trying to leap-frog directly to an institutional bliss point, a laggard within a
cluster should try to become more like the leader in its cluster in the short and
medium term. This goal is likely to be more attainable by virtue of its relative
modesty and because the reforming country then aspires to something that has been
tried by a country with a similar institutional setup.
Lastly, it is important that the reform process is incremental and leaves room for
experimentation rather than imitation without reflection. From a Schumpeterian
perspective, the quest to develop an optimal set of legal rules ignores a central
feature of successful economic development, namely, the continuous change,
innovation and adaptation of institutions and organizations in a competitive envi-
ronment. Reforms that are tailor-made to a country’s specific constraints and
opportunities through experimentation during a discovery process will likely be
more beneficial than reforms based on mere imitation (Lau et al. 2000; Qian 2002;
Hausmann and Rodrik 2003; Imbs and Wacziarg 2003; Sabel and Reddy 2007).
That being said, given the complexities involved, it is important to keep in mind
that simple legal principles often are preferable to a detail-oriented case-by-case
approach. One possibility is to strive for the sort of “simple rules for a complex
world” advocated by Epstein (2009).
We have proposed institutional reforms pertaining to nine broad areas:
(i) The rule of law and protection of property rights. These are the most
fundamental rules of the game, and all member states must ensure that they
are stable and secure. Regarding intellectual property rights, an important
balance must be struck. The rules must be strong enough to incentivize
investments in innovation, yet weak enough to allow knowledge diffusion.
(ii) Taxation. Many types of taxes affect entrepreneurial decisions. While tax
rates should generally be low or moderate, policy makers should strive for
simplicity rather than (targeted) exceptions and for a high degree of tax
neutrality across owner categories, sources of finance, and different types of
economic activities.
(iii) Savings, capital and finance. These institutions should be reformed to
support more private wealth formation and the creation of a dynamic
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venture capital industry, as these are crucial sources of finance, particularly
in the early stages of an entrepreneurial project. As a large share of savings
in the economy currently goes into pension funds, it is important that at least
part of these assets can also be invested in entrepreneurial firms, not just in
real estate, public stock and bonds.
(iv) Labor markets and social security. Institutions should facilitate the
recruitment of workers with the necessary competencies, and reforms
should strive for the removal of legal and institutional hurdles. Overly
stringent employment regulations may also create strong incentives for
actors in the skill structure to devise arrangements to circumvent the reg-
ulations, including the emergence of an underground economy.
Furthermore, incentives are best served by government income insurance
systems that encourage activation, mobility and risk-taking. Social security
institutions should enable the portability of tenure rights and pension plans,
as well as a full decoupling of health insurance from the current employer to
avoid punishing those individuals who leave a tenured job to realize
entrepreneurial ideas.
(v) Regulation of goods and service markets. Preventing market-leading
incumbents from unduly exploiting their dominant market position is
essential. Lowered entry barriers are key to this reform area, as is the
opening of areas that are typically closed to private production, such as
healthcare and schooling. Within a well-designed system of public financ-
ing, sizeable private production and contestability should be encouraged.
(vi) Bankruptcy law and insolvency regulation. Entrepreneurial failure provides
valuable information to other economic actors. Such ventures must be
discontinued so that their resources can be redirected to more productive
uses. Bankruptcy law and insolvency regulation should therefore be rela-
tively generous and allow for a “second chance”. However, it should not be
too easy to file for bankruptcy, as that would encourage exploitation and
destructive entrepreneurship, harming creditors as well as the rest of the
community.
(vii) R&D, commercialization and knowledge spillovers. R&D-spending is an
input; for it to translate into economic growth, entrepreneurs must exploit
the inventions by introducing new methods of production or new products
in the marketplace. Hence, instead of focusing on quantitative spending
goals and targeted R&D support, policy should strive to generally make it
easier to start and grow businesses.
(viii) Incentives for human capital investment. Policy should strive to create
incentives that encourage the individual to acquire knowledge and skills
whether through formal or workplace education. There must also be
incentives to supply such opportunities by the education system itself. In
particular, the U.S. university system could be a role model in that it seems
more responsive to the economic needs of society than European university
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systems, although Europe must avoid the steep tuition fees that would
hinder talented students from entering the university.
(ix) Informal institutions. Informal institutions affect the workings of formal
institutions but may also be important for the fostering of entrepreneurship
in its own right. The social legitimacy of entrepreneurs is particularly
important in this respect. Likewise, norms and habits that facilitate coop-
eration and impersonal exchange need to be strengthened, especially with
respect to trust. High-trust environments have been found to nurture market
entry, enterprise growth and productive entrepreneurship. However, the
extent to which policy can influence this is unclear. Furthermore, informal
institutions vary considerably across regions, which is likely to affect the
level at which measures should be implemented.
In summary, we hope that this work has inspired both confidence and humility
regarding Europe’s innovation future. Later work could analyze and present specific
policy proposals linked to the different clusters of European countries in more
detail. A good starting point for a more detailed reform agenda would be to identify
the leader in each cluster and base reform advice directed to that cluster or the
individual countries matching the leader’s institutional framework.
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Fig. A.1 Innovation score of EU member countries and other rich European countries, 2015. Note
The index is a composite of a total of 25 different indicators. Source European Union (2016)
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Fig. A.2 The size of the shadow economy in European countries and the U.S. in 2015 (in % of











Fig. A.3 Share of 25–34 year olds with upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education
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Fig. A.4 Collectivism/individualism and uncertainty avoidance in EU countries. Note
Collectivism/individualism describes a society’s preference for collectivism versus individualism.
The high side (individualism) describes a preference for a loosely-knit social framework in which
individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families, whereas the
low side (collectivism) represents a preference for a tightly-knit framework in society in which
individuals can expect their relatives or members of a particular in-group to look after them in
exchange for unquestioning loyalty. Uncertainty avoidance expresses the degree to which the
members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity about the future;
high-scoring countries maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior and are intolerant of unorthodox
behavior and ideas, whereas low scoring countries maintain a more relaxed attitude in which
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Fig. A.5 Trust and uncertainty avoidance in EU countries. Note Trust is measured as the share of
people in a country who believe that most people can be trusted. Uncertainty avoidance expresses
the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity
about the future; high-scoring countries maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior and are
intolerant of unorthodox behavior and ideas, whereas low scoring countries maintain a more relaxed
attitude in which practice counts more than principles. Source European Value Survey 2008 and
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Fig. A.6 Trust and collectivism/individualism in EU countries. Note Trust is measured as the
share of people in a country who believe that most people can be trusted.
Collectivism/individualism describes a society’s preference for collectivism versus individualism.
The high side (individualism) describes a preference for a loosely-knit social framework in which
individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families, whereas the
low side (collectivism) represents a preference for a tightly-knit framework in society in which
individuals can expect their relatives or members of a particular in-group to look after them in
exchange for unquestioning loyalty. Source European Value Survey 2008 and Hofstede (2010),
“Dimension Data Matrix”, http://www.geerthofstede.nl/dimension-data-matrix
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Table A.1 The standard dividend and capital gains tax rate in EU member countries and the U.S.,
2012






























Source Carroll et al. (2012)
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as % of total BERD
Austria 0.15 0.12 0.27 12.8
Belgium
(2012)
0.10 0.20 0.30 17.0
Czech
Republic
0.12 0.06 0.18 16.1
Denmark 0.06 0.06 0.12 6.1
Estonia 0.08 0.00 0.08 12.9
Finland 0.06 0.01 0.07 3.3
France 0.11 0.26 0.37 25.3
Germany 0.08 0.00 0.08 4.0
Greece 0.02 0.04 0.06 21.4
Hungary 0.19 0.13 0.32 32.7
Ireland
(2012)
0.07 0.16 0.23 20.7
Italy 0.05 0.00 0.05 6.9
Netherlands 0.02 0.15 0.17 15.3
Poland 0.04 – 0.04 9.1
Portugal 0.04 0.09 0.13 22.0
Slovakia 0.02 0.00 0.02 6.1
Slovenia 0.25 0.09 0.34 18.4
Spain
(2012)
0.08 0.02 0.10 15.6
Sweden 0.14 0.00 0.14 6.6
UK 0.08 0.08 0.16 14.5
USA
(2012)
0.19 0.07 0.26 13.5
Source OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2015
98 Appendix
Table A.3 State of cluster development in EU countries and the U.S., 2015






























Note Average answer to the survey question on the role of clusters in the economy: In your
country, how widespread are well-developed and deep clusters (geographic concentrations of
firms, suppliers, producers of related products and services, and specialized institutions in a
particular field)? [1 = nonexistent; 7 = widespread in many fields]. The scores denote the distance
to the frontier score of 100. Source World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey 2014–
2015, http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/
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Table A.4 University/industry research collaboration in EU countries and the U.S., 2015
Country Value Score (0–100)
Finland 5.97 82.8
USA 5.85 80.8



























Note Average answer to the survey question: In your country, to what extent do people collaborate
and share ideas between companies and universities/research institutions? [1 = not at all; 7 = to a
great extent]. The score measures the distance to the leading country (=100). Source World
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